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ABSTRACT 
THE ANAL YSIS OF TURKEY' S SECURITY CUL TURE IN LINE 
WITH 
THE 
EUROPEANIZA TION PROCESS 
Kara yiğit, Yas in 
MIR, Department ofintemational Relations 
Supervisor: Assistant Prof. H. Tarık Oğuzin 
September 2006 
The aim of this master' s thesis is to analyze the security culture of Turkey when sh e is 
in the accession process with the European Union. This research does not only dea! 
with the historical evolution of the security cultures of the European Union and Turkey, 
but it also tries to shed light on the changes on Turkey' s security culture on the road to 
EU membership. 
Keywords: Security culture, Europeanization, membership, changes 
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ÖZET 
TÜRKİYE'NİN BATILlLAŞMA SÜRECİNDEKİ GÜVENLİK 
KÜL TÜRÜNÜN ANALİZİ 
Karayiğit, Yas in 
YüksekLisans, Uluslararası İlişkiler Bölümü 
Tez Yöneticisi: Yar. Doç.H. Tarık Oğuzlu 
Eylül2006 
Bu yüksek lisans tez çalışmasının amacı Türkiye'nin Avrupa Birliği'ne üyelik 
sürecindeki güvenlik kültürünü incelemektir. Bu çalışma, Avrupa Birliği ve 
Türkiye'nin güvenlik kültürlerinin tarihi gelişimini incelerken, Türkiye'nin Avrupa 
Birliği'ne üyelik yolunda güvenilik kültüründe meydana gelen değişiklikleri de ele 
almaktadır. 
Anahtar Kelimeler: Güvenlik kültürü, Batılılaşma, üyelik, değişim 
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INTRODUCTION 
The issue of national security has attracted many scholars, philosophers, 
policy makers, and academicians throughout the history of the political 
communities. Security, defined as the lack of threat and physical danger, has been 
the main putpose of the mankind. Although the security culture and the notion of 
security are changeable with the changes in the world, the importance of security 
will always remain. In international relations, security is very important because the 
states make all their national and international policy decisions with the aim of 
preserving the security of the state and its subjects/citizens. This thesis attempts to 
analyze Turkey's changing security culture and threat perceptions at a time when 
she is in the process of EU membership. The literature is very rich in terms of this 
subject and this thesis has been written with the aim of contributing to those studies 
on the issue of security. 
This thesis will explain in which ways and to what extent the accession 
process with the EU has transformed Turkey' s security culture/identity/interests. It 
will be explained that the main purpose of Turkey in her attempts to join the EU, is 
that she wants to increase her own security via integrating herself to the global 
international system. Turkish officials believe that through integrating into the EU, 
Turkey would get more secure. However, the ambiguous attitude of the EU makes 
Turkey consider that the Europeans want to exclude Turkey out of the union. Turkey 
ı 
is busy with what policies she should fo !lo w if the EU insists on excluding Turkey 
from integration. Although Turkey has carried out a good dea! of reforms according 
to the criteria of the EU, she stil! seems to be very away from integration. As this is 
the case, Turkey becomes vulnerable to the separatist movements and demands. 
This thesis wi!l conclude that for these reforms to be successful and in order to make 
Turkey a secure state in the globalization era, Turkey has to be included in the EU. 
The fırst chapter will dea! with the theoretical dimension of security. 
Security is one of the key aspects that no state can ignore in order to sustain the 
health of the authority. This importance of security leads the govemments into 
developing some strategies for both reaching a secure situation and then, preserving 
it. Furthermore, states have a responsibility to be the guardians of not only 
sovereignity but also the people's identity. Since !980s, identity has gained much 
more importance. Thus, the states did not only work hard to protect sovereignty, 
they had to protect their citizens' identity from being assimilated. However, this 
process is not simple, because the path to security is not straight, it acts !ike a 
labyrinth; dealing with that labyrinth and not getiing lost in that depends on making 
the right decisions at right times. This necessity is closely related with the 
characteristics of each nation; each society evaluates the real life and the threats 
differently and reacts in different ways; therefore, in order to reach the security at 
best conditions, the nations should generate their own strategies. 
The approaches different nations employ about security can be named as 
English school approach, neo-realist approach, liberal approach, constructivist 
approach and revisionist approach; these approaches differ in their perception of the 
reallife and international relations and are used for different solutions to the security 
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problem. Neo-realist scholars believe that international community is a chaotic 
entity and, therefore, each state has to work hard to be able to protect itself. Like in 
Robbes' state of nature, the physically more powerful state, while there is no 
binding law, would swallow the others. S ince being powerful is the most desirable 
position, each state should be able to survive through building a powerful army and 
investing in armament. Otherwise, with no binding rules and superior ruler in the 
international community, the weakest state would go extinct with all its name, 
people and identity. Realist approach can be found too pessimistic to be applied to 
real life. The international community has some certain standards, rules and norms 
that are able to provide a relative degree of justice and order. Although decision-
making process is highly slow and achieving an agreement among the states can 
sometimes be difficult, the international system stil! possesses regular, operational 
system. Thus, members of the international system should not be obsessed with 
security issues in a paranoid manner. Heavy investments on the military areas would 
only decrease the welfare ofthe state. 
The second approach that we employ is liberal approach. The scholars of this 
tradition believe that international community is not totally chaotic environment 
with a minimum amount of cooperation and mutual trust; rather there is cooperation 
in the international community that lets individual states not get obsessed with their 
physical safety but also provide for their welfare in all aspects. Moreover, domestic 
politics, needs and actors are not secondary to international politics but they are 
equally important for security of all individual state. No state is an island; the states 
coexist and need each other. Therefore, cooperation is and should be inevitable for 
the states to resolve their domestic and international problems. 
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The third approach is revisionist one that interests in domestic problems and 
dilemmas of the third world countries. Such states must build a powerful military 
force because they are facing a double security dilemma. The regime and the 
goverrunent are not under guarantee to survive in these kinds of states because there 
is always a threat from within state. In the process of democratization, these states 
have a rest on military to mute the interi or discontent and opposition. 
The fourth groups of scholars, constructivists, take individuals and identity 
as the heart of their argument and believe that it is the individuals and national 
identity that the states should work to provide security of. Constructivists are 
successful in their perception of threat because with the process of globalization, 
states started to put identity protection at the top of their security agenda. 
Lastly there is the fifth approach that is divided into two, solidarists and 
pluralist. According to both solidarist and pluralists, there are certain rules and 
moral principles that link the members of the international community. However, 
they differentiate in their priorities. Wlıile solidarists believe that it is the individuals 
who are premier in security policies, pluralists believe that states should be able to 
protect sovereignty and repulse any foreign intervention in the first place. 
As a conclusion, there are many countries that can exemplify the relation 
between culture and security policy. There is stili one common thing among the 
policies that different nations use for security, they aim to preserve their national 
identity and resist to be assimilated. Also, the states can only exist if they can 
construct a security policy that is successful enough in protecting sovereignty of the 
nation that they represent. In this chapter, the importance of cultural traits, the 
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different perceptions of threat and the different forrus of security policies will be 
discussed. 
The second chapter will explain the threats and security strategies of the 
European Union and will examine which stages that EU has passed in order to 
achieve its contemporary situation. The European Union is a very important project 
that has helped its members avoid the danger of war. After WW2, there was an 
emergence of the understanding of collective security among the powerful European 
states. After the experience of two major wars, the Europeans understood that they 
had to be very cautious in order not to face such a situation again. Furthermore, 
there was the threat of Communism. Therefore, these two major problems 
encouraged them to act collectively. The aim of constructing a pan-European 
collective identity within the EU zone underlined the significance of security issues. 
The legacy of two world wars and the communist threat from the East forced the 
European countries to speed up their integration process and adopt a cooperative 
approach on security. The 1948 Brussels Agreement and then the appearance of 
NATO were the early steps to reach security in Europe. 
Despite this, until the end of the Cold W ar, Europeans could not seriously 
come and agree that they needed a collective security and foreign policy 
establishment in order to be a union, thus safe and powerful in the contemporary 
world order. Euro-skeptics supported the idea that NATO should never be 
underınined. They believed that NATO should be the authority to supply peace and 
order for the international society, with no need for a distinct European collective 
army. There were some reasons behind this idea of Euro-skeptics and they will be 
counted in the following sections. This chapter will not only highlight the main 
tenets of the EU' s security culture but also try to explain what kind of changes 
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miglıt take place in the security understanding of the countries that aspire to join the 
EU. 
In the third chapter Turkey' s security concept will be analyzed in a detailed 
way so that it would be easier to depict what kind of changes have taken place 
during Turkey's accession process with the EU. So, chapter starts by giving detailed 
information about the main characteristics of Turkey' s security culture. 
Turkey is perceived as an important regional power thanks to her unique 
geopolitical location. She shares borders with key countries in the world, so she has 
to follow a very careful foreign policy during her interaction with her neighbors. At 
this po int militaristk power com es to scene in terms of pursuing successful foreign 
policy and ensuring Turkish Republic's security. In fact the military has always 
been the most important security actor since the foundation of the Republic. It has 
always supported westernization process as a key security strategy. 
The security-oriented did in fact start during the Ottoman Empire and it was 
later inherited by the new Turkish Republic. Turkey' s making alliances with 
westem powers during the Second World W ar and being a member of NATO in 
1952 during the Cold War era were good exarnples in this regard. And even today 
Turkey's EU membership efforts can be interpreted in the same vein. The 
membership process enforces Turkey to take more concrete steps on her 
westernization strategy. This in returu leads a quite number of Turkish people to 
critically exarnine the EU membership criteria from a security perspective. Some 
European demands are increasingly seen as threatening the main tenets of Turkey' s 
security identity. For exarnple Turkey doesn't seem to renounce her unitary state 
system, as the EU requires. This is one point that makes Turkey confront with the 
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EU since the EU wants to bring federal system to this country. Plus the EU.has 
concems about the enlargement; especially on the issue of Turkey's prospective 
membership because the EU members believe that the moment Turkey becomes 
member she will bring terror, poverty, minority, ete. problems along her side. This 
chapter also explains the impacts of the EU accession process on Turkey's security 
understanding in the following way in the next paragraph. 
The conclusion part will simply sununarize the main fındings of the research 
and make some prediction as for the future. This is a timely research, for Turkey has 
already reached an irreversible stage in i ts relations with the EU. The challenge is 
that during the accession process not only Turkey would need to face EU-oriented 
challenges in terms of its security understanding but also the EU would have to 
fıgure out how Turkey' s prospective membership might impact EU's future identity. 
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CHAPTERI 
THEORETICAL APPROACHES TO THE CONCEPT OF 
S ECURITY 
This chapter is important in the sense that it will explain which theoretical 
approach is in compliance with the security developments in the accessian process 
of Turkey with the EU. Through which approaches to security can one analyze the 
security identities of the EU and Turkey? Can any theoretical approach to security 
help one better understand the ways the accessian process with the EU effects 
Turkey's security understanding? These are important questions and this chapter 
will basically exarnine altemative theoretical approaches to security. 
2.1 Defınition of Security 
Security is a dynarnic concept, which can be shaped according to the date, 
and/or environment that is concemed with.1 Security policies are changeable when 
the society and/or political culture change. We can basically define the word 
'security' as the lack of threat and danger, however such broad definition would 
definitely be void because even the understanding of the concepts of threat, risk, 
danger, harm, and so on are changeable. A perception of threat according to one 
1 K. Krause and M. Williams 1996, 'Broadening the Agenda ofSecuri1y Studies: Politics and 
Methods', M ershan International Studies Review 40: 229-54; K. Booth and P. V ale 1997, 'Critica! 
Securi1y Studies and Regional Insecuri1y: The Case of Southem Africa' Critica/ Security Studies: 
Concepts and Cases; K. Krause 1998, 'Theorizing Securi1y: State Formation and the "Third World" 
in the Post-Cold W ar World' Review of International Studies (21)1: 125-36; S. Dalby 2002, 
Environmental Security: The Geopo/itics ofCo/onisingNature. Minneapolis: Universi1y of 
Minnesota Press. 
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state may not be the same to the others. Also, as time goes by, a threat perception 
may perish and be replaced by another one. The point is that the societies, political 
agendas, both domestically and intemationally, are due to change, so is the lack of 
threat, security.2 Politics and the issues it covers are all doomed to change everyday 
and since security is a political issue, we cannot expect static and certain security 
understanding and notion to remain forever. 
When having a look at some of the political theorists' ideas about the 
existence and proper construction of a state, of Thomas Ho b bes and Machiavelli for 
instance, it is observed that their main argument about why people need a state is 
that they need a state in order to have security. States become sovereign and thus 
legitimate when it accomplishes to eliıninate any threat from inside or outside? The 
politicalleaders have to provide the security oftheir citizens. 
If the electorate have agreed on a particnlar group of leaders to make policies 
for the future of a country, this would mean that the security choice of the people 
have been equal with that of the winners of the elections; the security agenda of the 
govemment is trusted by the people. The political leaders define the threat, make 
solutions to eliminate it, but they do these without making a concession from their 
sovereignty and identity. As Simon Dalby and David Campbell endeavor to put 
forth that during the Cold W ar, the security policy of the United States was directly 
influenced by the identity politics, meaning the United States offıcials have 
distinguished effectively between the Westem and the Eastem Bloc and denigrated 
2 M. McDonald 2002, 'Human Security and the Construction ofSecurity.' Global Society (16)3: 277-
95. 
3 M. Clarke 1993, 'Politics as Govermnent and Politics as Security' New Perspectives onSecurity. 
London: Brassey's; R. Lipsclıutz 1995, 'On Security' On Security. New York: Columbia University 
Press; M. Dillon 1996, Politics ofSecurity, London: Routhledge. 
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it. Bill Mc Sweeny identically emphasizes how identity is crucial for the collective 
security policies ina society. 4 
The concept of security has resembled the considerable changes in the 
system of international community and the scholars have started to suggest various 
new theories with the political actors introducing a new style of policies since the 
end of Cold W ar. The conventional discourse of security has differentiated and the 
insuffıciencies of the old security system is now being attempted to be fulfılled by 
the international bodies and individual states rapidly. 5 However, none of these 
attempts has reached a concrete result yet; all the discussions about the defınition, 
understanding about security point to a state of commotion. The only fact that is 
accepted by all the scholars and academicians is that the conventional defınition and 
understanding of security has changed. 
2.2 Theoretical Approaches to Security 
2.2.1. The (Neo) realist Approach to Security 
First of all, conventionally, security has been defıned as being free from 
danger physically.6 Such defınition was plausible since the states were seen as the 
protectors of their citizens from the dangers emanating from the external 
environment. The method and threat understanding of the states have !ed to the 
conventional security discourse, realist approach to security, which puts an emphasis 
on a strong military as well as the need to make arrangements with the other states 
4 B. Buzan et all998, Security: A New Frameworkfor Analysis, London: Lynne Rienner. 
5 http://spirit.tau.ac.il/zeevnıaozlqhaicplhtml 
6 Patrick Morgan, 'Regional Security Complexes' in David A Lake and Patrick Morgan (eds) 
Regional Orders: Building Security ina New World, Pen State UP, 1997, pp. 50-3. 
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and going into war if necessary. 7 Therefore, for decades, states have preferred to 
follow this realist approach in order to keep their environment secure. 8 
When the realist approach and how it has been applied is analyzed largely, it 
is fırstly seen that realists take the nation-state as the focus of their security studies. 
For realists, state is the major actor in the international community, which works for 
the benefıt of her citizens. S ince the state is the most important body, security is 
nothing more than the state' s safety from the outside dangers. This is normal, for the 
international community is a chaotic body with no supreme and regular authority to 
provide order.9 
As the international community is said to be a chaotic grouping, security 
becomes the most important value that states see armament in their national 
interests, thus be secure. Naturally, this situation leads to the so-called security 
dilemma. ı o Other states feel threatened by the deterrence-based security policies of 
their fellow states. 
The anarchic international community also pushes states to adopt a particnlar 
style of security policies, which are extremely irrelevant to rationale of domestic 
policies. ı ı While domestic policies are applied in a regulated way through laws and 
stable bodies, the international policies are not; the international system is not 
reliable since it lacks a sound, secure law system and a leading organization. These 
7 Zeev Maoz, 'Regional Security in the Middle East: Past, Present and Future' Journal ofStrategic 
Studies, 20/1, March 1997, pp. 1-46. 
8 Henry A. Kissinger, Diplomacy, NY: Simon aod Schuster, 1994. 
9 Stephen W alt, 'The Renaissance ofSecurity Studies', International Studies Quarterly 35/2 June 
1997, pp. 211-40. 
10 Robert Jervis, 'Cooperation underSecurity Dilemma', World Politics 30/2 Jaouary 1978, pp. 167-
214. 
11 John A. Vasquez, The Power of Politics, z•' Ed., Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1998. 
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circumstances, according to realists, cause states to impose policies which will 
provide them security and peace based on "self-help" principle12 
Another important point is that states show a regular and organized image in 
fields other than security, for example intheir financial, managenal relations. This is 
important because we see that the chaotic nature of the international community 
turns out to be a systematic community when it comes to economics, management 
and so forth. 13 
The agreements and arrangements between states in the field of security 
appear to be necessary since otherwise the anarchic nature would swallow them. 
These agreements and arrangements either rest on informal or formal rules and via 
both kind ofrules.14 
Realists believe that states' need to feel secure and safe with making no 
concession on sovereignty, national identity and integrity -in the chaotic 
international community-. Therefore, in order to preserve its life, sovereignty, 
national identity and integrity, states should and does invest on armament and 
military in a legitimate way. A large and powerful military is assumed to contribute 
to the state's political and economical goals whenever necessary. 15 
12 Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics, Reading: Addison-Wesley, 1986. 
13 Stephen D. Krasner, 'Structural Causes and Reginıe Consequeuces: Regimes as lntervening 
Variables'.lnternational Organization 3612 Spring 1982, pp. 185/205. 
14 Robert Jervis, 'Securi1y Reginıes', International Organization, 36/2 Spring 1982, pp. 357-78. 
15 John Mearsheinıer, The Tragedy ofGreat Power Politics, New York: W. W. Norton, 2001; 
Stephen W alt, 'The Progressive Power ofRealism', American Political Science Review 9114 
December 1997, pp. 93 1-35; Jack S. Levy, 'W ar and Peace', in W alter Carlsnaes et al, (eds.) 
Handbook of International Relations, Thousand Oaks, California: Sage, 2002, pp. 350-69. 
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Realists support the idea that states consider national security as the most 
basic purpose in their agenda and they consider the extemal threats as the main 
impediment to their safety. What the fellow states aim at, talk about and do are of 
great concem, thus each state works hard to be ready and powerful with a well-
equipped military force and a good dea! of diplomatic power whenever she feels 
under threat or attack. 
In the making of security policy, states begin with deciding what the threat 
is, where it is coming from and what consequences it would cause. Then officials 
decide what the most successful policy, with the least possible cost, to eliminate it 
could be. They decide on the instruments to be adopted to eliminate alıeady 
designated threats. Afterwards, security agents implement the security policies 
adopted. Finally, both practitioners and observers evaluate the consequences of this 
whole process. 
The main instrument to achieve security is to have a formidable and deterrent 
army. The degree of success in this would hinge on the economic potential of states. 
Another instrument is to form security alliances with other states against common 
extemal threats. 
Realists adopt an instrumental approach towards intemational/regional 
institutions. They are highly skeptical about the m eri ts of regional cooperation. They 
find security cooperation difficult for concems over relative gains. Suspicions on the 
true intentions of others would prevent it. A regional cooperation would be likely 
13 
when there were a commonly shared threat in the region. 16 NATO can be given as 
an example to this. All in all, realists think that the anarchic international 
environment leads states to adopt similar security understanding and policies. States 
are assumed to be !ike billiard balls. Threats to security are external. Threats are 
observable and measurable. Security policies are instrumental in the sense that the 
goal is to enforce others to make costlbenefit analysis. Security would come if 
others were deterred from challenging the status quo. 
2.2.2. The Liberal Approach to S ecurity 
The roots of this approach can be claimed to rest on the studies of Keohane 
and Nye or Mansbach and Vasquez; they all perceived world politics as an arena 
which requires states to be interdependent on each otherY Liberal approach is 
distinguished from the realist approach on three important points as shown below: 
First of all, liberals do not agree with the realists that states' first and most 
valuable goal is their survival; there are many times when states do not put the 
purpose of survival on the fırst place since the issues of the international community 
are more about economic, political, social and environmental problems that the 
states face. Realists exaggerated physical safety and misses economic, 
envirorırnental, social kinds of safety. 
Secondly, domestic actors and politics are crucial for a proper national 
security policy: Domestic actors and their policies unconditionally infinence the 
16 John Mearsheimer, "The False Premise oflntemational lnstitotions', International Security, 1913 
Winter 1994-5, pp. 5-59. 
Robert O. Keohane and Joseph Nye, Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition, 
Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1977; llichard Mansbach and John A. Vasquez, In search of 
TheoryNY: Columbia UP, 1981. 
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national security policies. After all, the reason why each state differs in its national 
security policy is because each one of them has a unique domestic policy process. In 
this sense, regimes matter. States are not unitary actors and do not act !ike billiard 
balls. 
Lastly, the construction of the international community that consists oflike-
minded regimes would increase security. If those regimes were democracies, then 
the prospects of regional/international security and cooperation would dramatically 
increase. 
After displaying this general picture, the liberal approach to security can be 
handled ina little more detailed way. The protagonists ofliberal approach claim that 
the international environment can be chaotic and anarchic as well as cooperative and 
peaceful. The states should not only invest on military armament but also provide 
their citizens with infrastructure, the citizens' social and economic well-being. 
Realists' view that states have to work hard for security since any threat 
might be deadly for their presence is partially accepted by liberals. In liberal 
perspective, economic, cultural, social and environmental well-being are heavily 
influenced by physical security.18 
Liberals consider the security policy as a "bargaining process" that takes 
place at two different levels, internal and external. Domestically, the goal is to help 
achieve a consensus among various interest groups on the details of a security 
18 Zeev Maoz, 'Threat, Opportuni1y, and National Securi1y Policy Outcomes', Paper presented at the 
anuual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Boston, Sept 1998, pp. 1-4. 
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policy. Extemally, the goal is to make other states accept this domestically pre-
conceived security policy. 
Liberal scholars of security support the idea that states should utilize non-
militaristic tools whlle imposing their national security policy. The non-militaristic 
tools for security can be counted as economic assistance, economic relations, 
cultural ties, political cooperation, sanctions, embargos, and so forth. 
Since liberals believe that military means should be secondary to economic, 
cultural, social, institutional tools, they argue that possibility for regional and 
international security cooperation increase with non-military security instruments 
adopted. The neo-liberal version of the liberal school assumes that regional and 
international organizations would facilitate security cooperation since 
institutionalized relations would increase trust, confıdence and good faith among 
states. Uncertainty over international relations would decrease as states experienced 
institutionalized relations. Neo-liherals also believe that international security 
cooperation is likely because states value their absolute gains rather than relative. 
2.2.3. The Revisionist (Critica/) Approach to National Security 
Before explaining the critica! (revisionist) approach to national security, it 
should be pointed that the approaches given above have taken the developed states 
as the center of their argument with no regard to the underdeveloped, failed states of 
the world. They have analyzed the threat perceptions and understandings of the First 
World. The developed states are ruled by consolidated democracies where the 
people do not question the legitimacy of the states and where there is stability all the 
time. The failed, underdeveloped states, however, dea! with this question of 
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legitimacy all the time because their coming to power and their governance are 
always questioned since they are iliiberal democracies or stili in the democratization 
process. 
The subjects of the realist and liberal approaches have been the developed 
states, thus both approach missed the threat perception and security understandings 
of the failed states. However, failed states, the underdeveloped part of the world also 
have a security culture and threat perceptions, even though they can be different 
from those of the industrialized countries. Failed states, before dealing with the 
external enemy, have to eliminate the domestic opposition and threats. It is the 
politicians who determine the security policy along with the military. If the 
government, however, remains illegitimate for some people or group of people, then 
such government's security policy against the perceived external threats would 
automatically be void. 
The revisionist approach is mainly the approach of the underdeveloped states 
that are in democratization process, dealing with a high degree of instability. 19 S ince 
these states have to struggle with the domestic instabilities heavily as well as the 
outside dangers, it is a must for them to possess a powerful military which would be 
the main guarantee of the state's survival. As military being the major institution for 
the state, democracy may be harmed with the civilians being powerless in the policy 
making process. Therefore, revisionists believe that the most basic purpose of the 
states is to be the indisputable authority inside or outside relying on their militaristic 
19 Barry Buzan, People, State and Fear: The National Security Problem in International Relations, 
Chapel Hill: University ofNor1h Carolina Press, 1983; Robert M. Rosh, 'Third World Militarization: 
Security Webs and the States they Ensnare'. Journal ofConjlict Resolution, 32/4 Dec 1988, pp. 671-
98; Mohammed Ayoob, The Third World Security Predicament: State Making, Regional Conflict and 
the International System, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1995; Barry Buzan, Ole Waever, Jaap De 
Wilde (eds.), Security: A New Frameworkfor Analysis, Boulder, CA, Lynne Rienner, 1997. 
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force. That is to say, revisionists, at fırst place, give importance to the domestic 
strength of a state, because everything starts from within the nation. 
The revisionist approach is distinguished from both liberal and realist 
approaches in the sense that it deeply investigates the relationship and interaction 
between the state and the military. 
The three basic assumptions of the revisionists can be counted as given 
below: 
a) The main concern of the regimes is how to hold on to power when there is 
a threat to their authority: All the policies of security and attempts to increase the 
welfare of the nation are carried out for one basic purpose, which is to survive as the 
rulers of the nation. For many states, the actual threat Ii es inside the borders of the 
state. Therefore, states should impose such national security policies which have the 
domestic threats as their main target. 
b) The states utilize the very same tools for making and irnplementing a 
national security policy against both domestic and international dangers: The states 
are obsessed with how to survive and put an end to internal opposition and dangers, 
and this obsession is no way secondary to states' desire to survive on the 
international level without making concessions from their sovereignty and integrity. 
On both domestic and international levels, against the enemies, the state trusts only 
in its military forces. 
c) There is an undoubted inequality between the democratic fırst world and 
the democratizing/authoritarian third world states in terms of their national security 
tools, policies and acquisitions: The regime decides how much the military will be 
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powerful ina state; ifthere isa consolidated democracy, as in the case of developed 
couııtries, then the role of the military would never be superior to that of the 
civilians. However, if the regime is on the process of democratization or 
authoritarian for worse, then the military would be the major player in the state's 
policy making and implementation process. Therefore, the underdeveloped couııtries 
of the Third World, with a low democratic development, have to rely on military to 
enforce national security policies. 
After displaying this general picture, the revisionist approach can be handled 
deeply. The states need national security for the regime's continuity, sovereignty 
and integrity against the domestic and exterior dangers. 
Revisionists see the center need for security in the states' obligation to give 
importance to national security because there is always a danger from the inside 
forces and also outside forces which threat the continuity of the regime and thus 
sovereignty and integrity of the state. Since the state faces huge enmity from the 
inside, after all, the regime is not a consolidated democracy, there is no alternative 
choice for the state is left; the state has to eliminate the internal threats fırstly and 
immediately. 
The security agenda is made with the combination of the views of the 
political actors, intelligence services and the militaristic staffs of the state that come 
together, look at the conditions, examine both the domestic and external threats and 
reach a resolution. It should again be pointed that if the international and domestic 
security policies are in a contradiction, domestic conflict' s resolution uııdoubtedly 
takes precedence. 
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Revisionists believe that the military forces and diplomatic forces as the 
preferential tools for national security; these tools are of great benefıt to make the 
state capable of eliminating its enemies fırstly from the inside and then from the 
outside. Military, for them, is an important symbol of the state's strength. The state 
could give the message of i ts external and internal enemies that it is ready to protect 
itself whenever it becomes necessary. Also, diplomatic agreements and 
arrangements would help a state increase its legitimacy and power in the eyes of 
internal and external audience. 
Ironically, the revisionist approach entails a two-fold security dilemma for 
the states. While the states have to face the conventional version of security 
dilemma that the security measures of a particnlar state lessens its security because 
the other states will feel as threatened by that particnlar state and will take measures 
in response to it. As if the conventional security dilemma were not enough, the state 
has to face another security dilemma which arises from its measures taken against 
the internal enemies; this doubles its security fears because now, acting so, it 
increases both its internal and external threats. Briefly, the state, as long as remains 
inharmonious inside and outside, has to be prepared to face more conflict and 
instability generating from within the state or outside of the state. 
It can be concluded that Turkey, in her accession process with the EU, has 
been transforming from a revisionist understanding of security to a neorealist and a 
neo-liberal understanding. Although Turkey has more problems about regime, her 
main concern is not regime survival. 
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2.2.4. U nderstanding of Security According to English School 
Before trying to narrate the English School approach to the concept of 
security what to do fırst is to decide whether there is an English School discourse of 
security. For this purpose it is necessary to make it apparent that the approach of the 
English school rests on theory and it perceives world politics a concept that is 
arranged according to agreed rules and norms of different states of the world. The 
formders of English School, Hedley Bul! and Martin Wight suggested that the 
international society includes a bunch of fields such as security, law, history and 
economics, and each field needed to be analyzed by a unique methodology, 
therefore English School had to use a pluralist methodology, which made it hard to 
talk about a single English School.20 Also, English School protagonists did not make 
a clear distinction between themselves and realists or cosmopolitanists.21 Therefore, 
although it is not possible to indicate to a particnlar definition of security given by 
the English School, some general ideas about English School' s the concept of 
security can be narrated. 
First of all, English School is unique in its understanding of security because 
it binds together the practical and ideal politics. The scholars of English School 
support the idea that practically, security serves for the national benefits in a given 
state. As Herbert Butterfield and Martin Wight point out, a nation' s balance of 
power and its military force, both are changeable according to time and place, are 
20 T. Dunne and N. Wheeler 1996, 'Hed1ey BuiJ's P1uralism of the InteiJect and Solidarism of the 
Will' Millennium: Journal of International Studies (21)3: 91-108 
21 R. Little 2000, 'The Englisg School's Contribution to the Study of International Relations.' 
European Journal of International Relations (6)3, 397. 
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crucial for i ts security. On the other hand, ideally, the security has to satisfy moral 
conditions; after all is not war all alıout values and norms? 22 
From all these points, three basic ideas of English School scholars can be put 
forward, first of which is that security is "a normative value rather than an 
instrumental object". Their second idea is that security is a concept that is shaped by 
the society and thus it is flexible. Thirdly and finally they believe that all actions 
alıout security occur inside a political community which may or may not be a 
particnlar state. Whether thought ina pluralist or solidarist manner, the international 
arena is a scene to stage actions, conducts of security such as "human security" 
which is very important in the international arena and "security communities" with 
common rules, values and benefitsP 
The English School scholars can be classified as either pluralist or solidarist, 
as Herbert Bull claims. The common point of them is their perception of states 
system as a "society of states" which has particnlar rules, values and establishments. 
Bull goes on to say that there is a dispute between the members of this society of 
states alıout the normative thinking on the debate whether there should be wars, 
what the roots of international law lie and to what degree the individuals are 
important in international policy decisions. When the pluralist approach is taken into 
account, it will be seen that the state's right to exist along with the fellow states has 
already been recognized by the international society thanks to the acknowledged 
principles of sovereignty and non-intervention, which are key to security. 
22 Reus- C. Sirnit 200la, 'The Strange Death of Liberal International Theory' European Journal of 
International Law (12)3: 573-94. 
23 E. Adler and M. Barnett 1998, Security Communities. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; C. 
Thomas and P. Wilkin 1999, Globalization, Human Security and the African Experience. Boulder, 
co: Lynne Rienner; A. Beliamy 2004b International Society and !ts Critics. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
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Solidarists, on the other hand, believe that the state is not important here 
because the community whose security we are concemed with is not limited to a 
particnlar state. They argue that there are agreed norms and moral principles in the 
international society24 and since the states will work for protecting these moral 
values, security for all individuals will be automatically accomplished. Hedrey Bull 
says that we can speak of a solidarist society when its member states are successful 
in enforcing and abiding by the same laws. It can be claimed that while the pluralists 
concem themselves with the question whether all the states in the international 
society are all secure, the solidarisis takes the security of who le world' s individuals 
as the heart of their arguments and believe that the pluralism also helps for a more 
secure world for individuals with its political boundaries.25 
The English School has both similar and distinct points with liberal and 
neorealist approaches. The pluralists resemble the neo-realists in the sense that they 
both see the sovereign state as the center value and that the individuals of the states, 
the identity of the nation do not matter, at all. The liberals, as the solidarists believe 
that the values and identity, culture that a state's individuals possess are what matter 
in the security context Although the neo-realists and pluralists did not pay enough 
attention to the domestic situation and the importance of internal values and 
position, the liberals di d not fal! in such a mistake. 
Here, the European Union can be considered to be a good example to both 
solidarist and pluralist approaches. The current situation of the EU resembles the 
idea of pluralists because the union still remains as intergovemmental. France and 
24 Link1ater 1998, The Transformatian of Political Community, London: MacMillan, 166-7. 
25 Ibid. 
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the Netherlands rejected the Constitution, Britain insists on her own traditional 
currency, there are Euro-skeptics and there is no co!lective European identity. Thus, 
it can said that the EU is an exarnple to the pluralist approach. However, the 
expectations and efforts of the European states are towards an integrated Europe 
who has a comınon foreign and security policy, co!lective identity. No need to 
mention that the union had already been integrated in the economic terms. If Europe 
integrates through a pan-European collective identity, as a supranational 
organization then the solidarist approach would be right in the European Union case. 
NATO, on the other hand, fıts into the pluralist approach. 
English School thought about security seems to be plausible in the sense that 
it pays attention to international law, takes individuals and different identities into 
account and also moral part of the picture. The decision makers come to power via 
democratic processes, meaning people appoint the leaders who make decisions 
about security. It is natural that the leaders' fırst priority should be protection of the 
individuals' life, rights, values, morality and identity. What pluralists see in 
international comınunity is that each state is recognized as a sovereign entity. 
Solidarists do not divide between the states' individuals; they see the international 
comınunity' s individuals as one. It seems that solidarists miss a crucial point here 
that individuals of different nations would not want to be titled as a member of 
international comınunity but as a member of his/her own country. The point is that 
each nation has a unique identity and would not give it up in favor of the 
international comınunity easily. Hence, pluralism seems to be more reasonable. 
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2.2.5. Constructivist Approach to Security 
Constructivists assume 1hat states' scope of activity is not only material but 
also societal and 1hey believe 1hat thanks to this scope, the states perceive their 
advantages properly.26 The material reality gains meaning only through the society's 
needs, perceptions and cultural constructions. National identities and interests are 
not given; 1hey are constructed through an interaction process. The society also 
construct the threat perception through that process because it is the society' s 
values, cultural identity 1hat decide what is threat and what is not. A nation's 
interests are not inflicted upon from by an outsirler but 1hey come into existence 
through state' s relationship with 1he environment it is located in. Constructivist 
scholars agree that security is a subjective issue, includes non-material kind of 
threats and 1hat it has a changeable purpose since it depends on 1he environmental 
context.27 Perception of where the threat is coming from is different for each states 
since every state differs from 1he o1hers in a way; geographically, culturally, 
environmentally, economically, and so on. 
For example, the United Kingdoru possesses more amount of nuclear 
armament than does Korean state. However, 1he UK is closer to the USA that 
Americans perceive Korea as a threat but not the UK although 1he UK possesses 
weapons of mass destruction. The po int is that the material reality gains i ts meaning 
through an interaction process which is also decided by the cultural and national 
values, identity. Since it is 1he securitization process what matters, then changes are 
inevitable. Today's enemy may turn out to be tomorrow's ally. Realists did not take 
26 Jeffrey T. Checkel, 'The Constructivist Turn in International Relations Theoıy', World Politics, Vol. 
50 (1998), pp 325-6. 
27 Keith Krause and Michael C. Williams, 'Broadening the Agenda ofSecurity Studies: Politics and 
Methods', Mershon International Studies Review, Vol. 40 (1996) p. 242 .. 
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the process-hased nature of security, whlch is due to change, and decided by the 
interaction. 
The realists claimed that the international community had an anarchlc nature. 
They mainly believed that the relations were enemy-type that there is a war of every 
state against every state. However, as Locke claimed, the relations of the anarchlc 
international community could also have rivalry-type relations or for better, as Kant 
had claimed, the relations could be friendshlp-type. The EU is an exarnple to the 
Lockean and Kantian kind of international community because the European states 
see the USA and the rogue states of the Middle East as rivals but they also construct 
friendly relations with many other states, too. Turkey, also does consider the 
international community as the EU because she is faced with many rivals and threat 
because of her geopolitical situation but she can stili build friendly relations with 
other nations, too. Realists, though, seem to have jumped to the conclusion that 
every state is alone, should see the others as enemies since the international 
community is chaotic. However, although the states may be rivals, not enemies, 
mutual agreements and discussions in a friendly manner would help them survive in 
the anarchlc international environment. 
As Arnold Wolfers points out, constructivist definition of security is being 
free from any danger or threat to the central values that if those historic values are 
safe, that particnlar community is secure. Here, it should be clarifıed that the realists 
failed to defıne what those hlstoric, central values are thus, at a time in whlch the 
world is tuming out to be a global village; realism seems to be insuffıcient to give a 
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clear security policy andfor uuderstanding to apply.Z8 Realism remains as unrefıned 
because it could not foresee the coming of globalization. 
In the context of globalization, constructivists prefer to analyze the effects of 
globalization on the central values that should be kept safe and secure. As pointed 
above, they do not look for a constant, objective threat but they attempt to fınd out 
what the joint threat perception is and how to purge this subjective, collectively 
perceived threat.29 It should be clarifıed that the individuals, communities and states, 
who are to decide what the threat is, are dependent on their environment, scope of 
activity. This interaction of the individuals, societies and states decide what the 
crucial values are, what the forms of threats on these values are and how the attaeker 
should be put out of action. And since the environments are changeable, the threat 
uuderstanding and responses to it will inevitably change accordingly. When we turn 
back to the globalization' s affects on threat uuderstanding, it is seen that what values 
the intergovernmental, supranational bodies give importance to may not be identical 
to the individual states' or societies' central values that are to be kept secure. Thus, 
only if the diversity of states agrees on a value to be protected, that value can be 
claimed to be central and will be protected. 
Security, being dependent on the environmental context, is doomed to 
change. 30 The main reason behind this fact is that the national actors, along with the 
global actors and organizations, are stil! very important in deciding and responding 
to the security issues in all levels. Copenhagen School distinguishes between the 
28 David A. Baldwin., 'The Concept of Security', Review of International Studies, Vol. 23 {1997), p. 
21; Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading: Addison Wesley, 1979), p. 126. 
29 Barry Buzan, 'Retbinking Security after the Cold W ar', Cooperation and Conf/ict, Vol. 32, No. 1 
(1997), p. 14. 
30 Krause and Williams, op. cit., p. 244. 
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state and the society and moving from this distinction, they form a different security 
discourse.31 The school considers the security asa naturally "dual" concept whlch is 
composed of "state security" based on sovereignty and societal security" based on 
identity. 
Copenhagen Scholars claim that the problems a particnlar state faces are 
either about security or political. If the perceived threat is political, then the state 
attempts to eliminate it through consensus, consultation and mutual discussions. If 
the threat is about security, then the state utilizes every means to end that security 
problem. Although security policy is mainly decided by the military offıcials, the 
main idea is that the security policy of officials has to be in compliance with the 
society's culture, needs and identity. Otherwise, without the consent of the society, 
security policies of officials would do no good. And all the making of the security 
policy, harmony between the military and the society's security understanding are 
all results of securitization process. This process ends with the naming of the 
'security' problems as 'political' problems. In the end, the society, military and the 
elected officials will have completed the securitization process with no exaggerated 
efforts to be secure. The harmony between the three and the process of constructing 
that harmony will automatically provide the state with security. 
Copenhagen School scholars explain that the societies form their identity 
based on shared culture, institutions, habits, traditions and so forth. Their interests 
are also decided according to their identities. Thus, societies react to any threat or 
31 JefHuysmans, 'Revisiting Copenhagen: Or, on the Creative Development ofa Security Studies 
Agenda in Europe', European Journal of International Relations, Vol. 4, No. 4 (1998), pp 479-505; 
Bill Mc. Sweeny, 'ldentity and Security: Buzan and the Copenhagen School', Review of International 
Studies, Vol. 22, No. I (1996), pp 81-93. 
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attack to their own identity very harshly; they can never stay muted when their 
identities are under attack. Thus the societal security does not become equal to the 
security of a nation but becomes equal to that of a community wrapped by an 
identity.32 When we consider Europe, these identity-concemed social groups are 
either states or ethnic minority groups. Thus, for a democratic state, the society's 
values appoint what security agenda the state is bound to and also if the democratic 
state can protect the identity of i ts people, then it can be counted as legitimate. But 
the point is that the world is globalizing rapidly and the individual states are losing 
influence. The values and identities of a particnlar state are almost forced to be 
adapted to those of the neighboring states', and as the process continue, to those of 
the global construction. And while the interaction between the states and the change 
of values are becoming inevitable, the ethlcal and moral values of a particnlar state 
remain to be unchanged and thus violate the globalization and construction of an 
agreed pocket of rules and values33 
Constructivists' argument that each state is unıque ın i ts purposes, 
geography, culture, identity, social and economic conditions and thus states are 
distinct from each other in their security perceptions also seems to be plausible. 
They pay attention to the societal security, which is an important strength of 
constructivist approach. States, mainly the democratic ones, are products of the 
people, the society. Thus, the states, while appointing a security agenda, have to take 
the people's demands; should protect the citizens from any damage to their identity. 
Beginning from 1 980s, globalization and i ts outcomes made the world states 
32 !ver B. Neumann, 'Co lleeti ve Identi1y Formation: Self and Other in International Relations', 
EuropeanJournal of International Relations, Vol. 2 (1996), pp 139-74; Ole Weaver, 'European 
Security Identities', Journal ofCommon Market Studies, Vol. 34, No. 1 (1996), p. 113. 
33 Jean-Marie Guehenno, 'The Impact of Globalization on Strategy', Survival. Vol. 40, No. 4 (I 998) 
p. 10. 
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remember how important identity is. Especially the underdeveloped states rested on 
their cultural, national values to protect themselves from the evils of globalization. 
After all, if a nation's identity is absorbed and swallowed, that nation becomes 
extinct. The only value that nev er loses importance is identity. A threat to identity is 
an absolute threat to the nation. Hence, constructivists are right in their claim that it 
should be the identity of the nation, or ethnic group that the states work hard to keep 
secure and safe. 
2.2.5.1. Relationship between Security Culture and Strategic Culture 
This seetion will be discussed under the Constructivist Approach because the 
importance of strategic culture and its relationship with security policy have been 
recognized and analyzed by the constructivists, as it will be seenin later paragraphs. 
The main point is that culture is also an identity and it is the constructivist approach 
that takes identity as the heart of their argurnent. 
There is an undeniable connection between the culture and national security 
policy as we see in the works of Thucydides, ancient Athenian po li tician and Sun 
Tzu, anthor of famous Art of W ar. Later Cari Von Clausewitz, German general and 
anthor of On W ar, had developed this idea of connection between strategic culture 
and security, daiming that the essence of war strategy should be not only physically 
defeating the enemy but also devastating the opponents morally, too. Hence, the 
enemy would have been terrifıed and discouraged forever. Clausewitz supported the 
idea that the people of the state were the number one tool in the way to a war-glory; 
he exemplifıed the French people who provided the armies ofNapoleon with human 
capital and a lyrical morale, made French armies defeat the enemies successfully. 
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Also, the Jeading politicians who declare and direct the war and naturally the 
so Idiers are the other most striking components of war. 34 
Clausewitz had written during the beginning of 1800s and Jack Snyder has 
contemporized his ideas with applying them to the Cold W ar, to the Soviet Union' s 
war strategy culture. Snyder' s ideas have almost razed the conventional national 
security culture, which rested on the domestic politics and demands. He argued that 
the political Jeaders compromise the people's needs with a militaristic proper 
strategy would bring the glory. In the case of Soviet Union, the strategy of 
intimidating the enemy through nuclear weaponry has been aresnit of the people's, 
political Jeaders' and the military forces' solidarity and of that public spirit. He 
explains his idea ofstrategy as it follows: " ... asa result of this socialization process, 
a set of general beliefs, attitudes, and behavior patterns with regard to nuclear 
strategy has achieved a state of semi-permanence that places them on the !eve! of 
'cultural' rather then mere policy.' 35 Just !ike Clausewitz, Snyder also gives 
secondary importance to the technological !eve! of development, the type of 
perception of the extemal dangers, and the historical, institutional traditions. 
Snyder claimed that although both Russian and the Aınericans have applied 
to the usage of nuclear arınaınent during the Cold W ar years, they were extremely 
distinct with their conceptions of nuclear weaponry and this distinction, he beli ev es 
is a resnit of their different strategic cultures, political cultures, historical and 
institutional strategies. The Soviet offıcials supported the proliferation of nuclear 
34 Michael Howard, 'Ciusewitz, Mau of the Year', New York Times, January 28, 1991, p. Al?. 
35 Jack Snyder, The Soviet Strategic Culture: lmplications for Nuclear Options, Santa Monica, 
California: RAND Corporation, 1977, R-2154-AF; Ken Bootlı, Strategy and Ethnocentrism, New York: 
Holmes and Meier, 1981. 
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weapons as a precautionary measure; for a preventive war if necessary. When 
Russian Empire's political history is thought, this is no surprise because, naturally, 
empires are monarchic, security-centered political systems. Snyder, from these 
points concludes that it is the strategic culture which decides the security threats, 
what weaponry will be used, how the threats will be reacted to, ete ... Since all states 
have distinct history and culture, their strategic culture and style will be different 
from each other. 
Many other national security policy analyses were carried out by various 
scholars after Jack Snyder, one of which is Strategy and Ethnocentrism of Ken 
Booth. In his work, Booth indicates to how different nations and their different ideas 
come up against about their dissimilar nuclear strategy cultures. Another important 
work about strategic culture is Nuclear Strategy and National Style of Colin Gray 
and in this book, the anthor again points to the histoncal and cultural differences 
between nations appoint their strategies as we haveseenin the Cold W ar between 
the USA and the Soviet Union. Every nation, Gray believes, has got a unique style 
and this style causes each nation to make different political decisions. He defınes 
strategic culture as it follows: " ... referring to modes of thought and action with 
respect to force, which derives from perception of the national historical experience, 
from aspirations for responsible behavior in national terms.'36 Strategic culture 
defınes what actual strategies will be carried out but he also points out that strategic 
culture only directs the national security policy for a particnlar period of time, not 
forever. After all, culture and people's needs are immune to changes and they 
interact with other cultures and people, nations; interaction also brings cultural 
36 Colin S. Gray, Nuclear Strategy and National Style, Lanham, Md.: Harnilton Press, 1986, pp. 36-7. 
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change. Hence, in result, new security culture starts to influence the national 
security policy_37 
After explaining the influences of strategic culture on national security 
policy, the scholars shift their attention to the practical dirnension of strategic 
culture; they see that in practical terms, too, strategic culture is unique for each 
nation. But it was hard to defıne and appoint a strategic culture for a nation, since, as 
told above, culture and histoncal experiences are on a movement, change every 
time. This attitude of nations, being different from each other in cultural, political, 
historical and strategic terms, requires a cross-national research. However, scholars 
accept the fact that a cross-national research would be very diffıcult to do as Gray 
states in his The Geopolitics of Superpower: "Social Science has developed no exact 
methodology for identi:fying distinctive national cultures and styles."38 Ken Booth 
also saw a nation's culture as the main determinant of its political and militaristic 
policy making. Another scholar, Yitzhak Klein indicated to the necessity of studies 
and research on the nations' strategic culture in order to have a more clarifıed and 
reliable set of security studies and research. As the scholars insisted on more such 
studies, 1980s became a decade when such studies and research were carried out 
successfully; however such studies were not going to be continuous after the 
dissolution of the Soviet Bl oc. 39 
37 Colin S. Gray, 'National Style in Srategy: The American Example,' International Security 6, No. 
2, 198l,p.35. 
38 Colin S. Gray, The Geopolitics ofSuperpower, Lexington: University Press ofKentucky, 1988, pp. 
42-3. 
39 Roland H. Ebel, Raymond Taras, and James D. Cochrane, Po/itical Culture and Foreign Policy in 
Latin America: Case Studies from the Circum Caribbean, Albany: State University of New York 
Press, 1991; Richard Ned Lebow and Thomas Risse-Kappen, eds., International Relations Theory 
and the End of the Co/d W ar, New York: Columbia University Press, 1995; Michael C. Desch, 
'Culture Clash: Assessing the Importance ofldeas in Security Studies', International Security 23, 
No. 1, 1999. 
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With end of the Cold W ar, the importance of cultural studies was started to 
be debated on as the following quotation from Y osef Lapid clarifies: 
"Culture and identity are staging a dramatic comeback in social theory and 
practice at the end of the twentieth century ... Political realists- who, under 
the impact oftheir Waltzian move to neorealism have harshly marginalized 
culture and identity- are cautiously partaking in this trend. Similarly, 
following a period of hostile indifference to 'ideational explanations', the 
time for ideas seems to have come around once again in International 
Political Economy."40 
Desch also deseribed this acceleration in cultural studies as a rebirth, which 
actually comes onto surface again with the help of constructivists who claimed that 
the leading politicians have to make policies that are consistent with the national 
culture.41 
The ilissolution of the Soviet Bloc gave life to constructivism which 
defended the importance of internal politics and national culture as Ted Hopf states 
as it follows: 
" ... Constructivism has no inherent focus on 'second image' accounts of world 
politics ... Constructivism provides a promising approach for uncovering those 
features of domestic society, culture, and politics that should matter to state identity 
and state action inn global politics ... Any state identity inworld politics is partly the 
product of the social practices that constitute that identity at home."42 
The main concern of the constructivist scholars is about the construction of 
the identity and how identity influences the developments in historical, traditional 
40 YosefLapid, "Culture's Ship: Retunıs and Departures in International Relations Theory', in Yosef 
Lapid and Friedrich Kratochwil, eds., The Return ofCulture and Identity in IR Theory, Boulder, 
Colo.: Lynne Rienner, ı996, p. 3. 
41 
; Michael C. Desch, 'Culture Clash: Assessing the lmportance ofldeas in Security Studies', 
International Security 23, No. ı, ı999. p. ı45; Aleımader Wendt, 'ldentity and Structural Change in 
International Politics', in in YosefLapid and Friedrich Kratochwil, eds., The Return ofCulture and 
Identity in IR Theory, Boulder, Co! o.: Lynne Rienner, ı 996, p. 47-64; Richard J. Ellis and Michael 
Thompson, eds., Culture Matters: Essays in Honor of Aaron Wildavsky, Boulder, Colo.: Westview 
Press, 1997. 
42 Ted Hopf, 'The Promise ofConstructivism in International Relations', International Security 23, 
No. !, ı998, p. 914; Jeffrey W. Legro, 'Culture and Preferences in the International Cooperation 
Two-Step', American Political Science Review 90, No. 1, 1996, pp. 118-37. 
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cultural ways. According to Alexander Wendt, the states work for the benefıt of its 
people who set the national identity, culture, and thus the state policies.43 Valerie 
Hudson also believes what directs the states' strategy is culture, people's way of 
attitude, coınmunication, living and so on. 44 
Contemporarily, too, identity has proved its importance in world politics. 
Starting with the globalization process in 1980, the world became an Americanized 
and capitalist-led locus. The undeveloped part of the world, however, found shelter 
intheir identity, which was each nation's, all and most important capital. And they 
perceived the key threat when they felt their identity was under attack. What 
constitutes identity is mainly culture and values. Therefore, there is no room for 
deny in the claim that security and strategic culture are mutually defined and 
practiced. 
Away from constructivist wave on the national security, many other works 
also indicate to the vitally important place of culture in deciding the security 
policies. One of these works is Cultural Realism: Strategic Culture and Grand 
Strategy in Chinese History by Alastair Johnston who attempts to find out how 
Chinese culture has shaped the militaristic response of China against the outside 
dangers through analyzing different dynasty-eras. He believes that Chinese culture 
caused the Chinese strategic policies to be defensive, sober, economic and non-
aggressive. Chinese offıcials, because of their cultural properties, chose to stay in 
defense and strike only if defense becomes useless. 45 Eventually, such strategic 
43 Alexander Wendt, 'Anarchy Is What States Make oflt: The Social Constrnction of Power Politics', 
International Organization, 46, No. 2, 1992, pp. 391-426. 
44 Valerie M. Hudson, ed., Culture and Foreign Policy, Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 1997, pp. 28 
45 Alastair Iain Johnston, Cu/tura! Realism: Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in Chinese History, 
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995, p. 1. 
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choice became an undeniable feature of Chinese security culture and policy-making 
style. 
The Chinese example proves that the factors that appoint the security policy 
are not always material conditions. Rather, the perception of the society decides 
what the threat is and what would be done to eliminate that threat. The cultural 
codes that a society possesses reflect years' experience, habits and meanings which 
give the meaning to the security. 
Another important example that depicts the relationship between the culture 
and security is France, which Elizabeth Kier deseribes as " ... the significance of 
organizational culture in the development of French military doctrine."46 Latin 
Arneri ca and India are the other regions of the world, which demonstrate that there 
is an undeniable relationship between culture and security understanding and 
• 47 conceptıon. 
46 Elizabeth Kier, 'Culture aud Military Doctrine: Frauce between the Wars', International Security 
19, No. 4, 1995. 
47 Stephen Peter Rosen, Societies and Military Power: lndia and [ts Armies, Ithaca, NY: Comeli 
University Press, 1996; Ebel, Taras aud Cochrane, Political Culture and Foreign Policy in Latin 
America, p. 5. 
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2.4. Conclusion 
1bis chapter has depicted the theoretical dimension of security. Security, the 
lack of threat, is said to be the most important task of the state; the state owes its 
existence to the need of national security. The masses elect a group of 
representatives whom they believe are capable of providing the nation secure and 
safe conditions. States are the guardians of sovereignty and the people's identity. 
Starting from 1 980s, identity has gained even more importance. The states di d not 
only work hard to protect sovereignty, they had to protect their citizens' identity 
from being assimilated. 
There are fıve approaches to security: English school approach, neorealist 
approach, liberal approach, constructivist approach and revisionist approach. 
Neorealist scholars consider the international community as chaotic entity and thus 
each state must work hard to be able to protect itself. Realists believe that a state 
should not count on the fellow states or international law because in chaos, every 
one would be busy of saving itself. Just as in Hobbes's state of nature, the physically 
more powerful state, since there is no binding law, would swallow the others. 
Hence, each state should be able to survive through building a powerful army and 
investing in armament. Otherwise, with no superior rules or mler in the international 
comrnunity, the powerless state would go extinct with all its name, people and 
identity. Realist approach seems to be too pessimistic to be applied to real life. The 
international comrnunity has some defınite rules and norms that are able to provide a 
relative degree of justice and order. Although decision making process is slow and 
reaching an agreement between the states become diffıcult sometirnes, the 
international society stili possesses regular, operational system. Therefore, states do 
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not have to be obsessed with security issues in a paranoid manner. Heavy 
investment in military would only decrease the welfare of the state. 
The second approach we covered is liberal approach, the supporters of which 
believe that international environment is not of a fully chaotic nature with a 
minimnm amount of cooperation and mutual trust; rather there is cooperation in the 
international community which lets individual states not get obsessed with their 
physical safety but also provide for their welfare in all senses. Also, domestic 
politics, needs and actors are not secondary to international politics and needs but 
they are equally irnportant for security of every individual state. No state is an 
island, the states coexist and need each other; cooperation is and should be 
inevitable for the states to resolve their domestic and international problems. 
The third approach is revisionist one which is interested in domestic 
problems of the third world states. These states have to construct a powerful military 
force because they are in danger of experiencing a double security dilemma. The 
regime and the government are not guarantecd to survive in these states because 
there is always a threat from within the state. These states, in the process of 
democratization, have to rest on military to mute the interior discontent and 
opposition. 
The fourth group of scholars, constructivists, takes individuals and identity 
as the heart of their argument and claim that it is the individuals and national 
identity that the states should work to provide security of. Constructivists are 
successful in their perception of threat because with the process of globalization, 
states started to put identity protection at the top of their security agenda. 
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Also there is the English School which is divided into two, solidarists and 
pluralists. Both pluralist and solidarist approaches consider international 
coınmunity's members are linked through certain laws and moral principles but they 
differentiate in their priorities: while solidarist scholars of English school believe 
that it is the individuals who are premier in security policies, pluralists believe that 
states should be able to protect sovereignty and repulse any foreign intervention in 
the fırst place. 
Finally, in this chapter, how strategic culture and security policy of a country 
are in interaction with each other have been narrated. There are many countries who 
can exemplify the relationship between culture and security policy. Strategic culture 
is said to be the most important determinant of the national security policy. Since 
each nation is of different culture and identity, each of them will have a distinct 
understanding of security, national security policy and threat perception. Each state 
has i ts own way of providing the security but one thing that is absolutely true is that 
the states can only exist if they can formuiate a security policy that is successful 




THE ANALYSIS OF THE EUROPEAN UNION' S SECURITY 
CULTURE 
This c hapter will depict ho w security is perceived by the EU, into which 
Turkey is trying hard to be integrated. It will be evaluated historically what stages the 
EU has passed in order to reach its contemporary image. It will be seen what 
diffıculties Turkey could face in the accession process. 
The aftermath of the WW2 marked the beginning of the Europe's collective 
security developments. After experiencing two major wars, the Europeans knew that 
they had to be very cautious in order not to experience such a devastating war again. 
They wanted to be prepared for possible German aggression since Germans were left 
resentful after causing the break-out ofboth world wars and also Westem Europeans 
wanted to be ready to eliminate any communist threat coming from the Eastern Bloc. 
Regarding the Cold W ar, it can be concluded that there is both a liberal anda 
constructivist approach at the same time by the European countries. But it should be 
pointed that neorealist approach has been more privileged in the era of the Cold W ar. 
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The fırst action on the way to collective security was with 1948 Brussels 
Agreement, which saw the establishment of an alliance among Britain, France, the 
Netherlands, Luxembourg and Belgium. Coıninform, established by the Soviet Union, 
made the Westem Bloc realize Eastemers had to be responded by collective 
organization and in 1949, the United States, Canada and the Westem Europe 
established NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization). NATO, from that time on, 
became the superior body to make and preserve peace and to intervene if necessary. 
Although the Westem Europe was already being contained by the United States 
against any influence from the Communist Bloc, The Westem Europeans wanted to 
have their own security policy against the Soviet threat. In this regard, the traces ofthe 
EU's distinctive security identity as it has increasingly become clear during the 1990's 
could be dated back to the Cold W ar years. 
Ironically, until the end of the Cold War, Europeans could not seriously 
come together and agree that they needed a collective security and foreign policy 
establishment in order to be a real union and thus, safe and powerful in this new world 
system. Until then, the Euro-skeptics supported the idea that NATO could never be 
undermined. They believed that NATO should be the body to provide peace and order 
for the international community, with no need for a distinct European collective army. 
There were reasons behind this idea of Euro-skeptics and they will be counted in the 
following sections. 
This particular chapter willlook at how Europe developed into a union; what 
stages it has passed in order to be able to reach a collective foreign and security 
policy. The questions of whether Europe possesses an independent common security 
identity and culture from those of the USA and what factors have led the European 
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states towards cooperation in the realm of security are significant. Firstly, the 
chronological evolution of the EU will be given. Then, it will be seen what differences 
the end of the Cold W ar had created in European defense and security system. Finally, 
it will be concluded that Europe stili lacks a solid collective foreign and security 
policy but as histoncal developments show, she is in her way to have one. 
3.1. Security Cooperation of the Western Europe during the Co/d W ar 
As given above the first important effort of the European powers to form a 
security organization came with 1948 Brussels Treaty, which constructed the EDC 
two years later, European Defense Community. It was aimed that through such an 
organization, a possible German aggression could be prevented and also the European 
states could stay safe from the Soviet threat. The threat perceptions of the Westem 
European states were the same; they were all cautious towards the German aggression 
and spread of communism. However, the efforts of French general Charles De Gaulle 
in the parliament surpassed and the French Parliament annulled the Treaty ofBrussels. 
The main argurnent of nationalİst De Gaulle and his supporters were that an EDC-like 
organization would bring an end to the sovereignty and nationalİst values of the 
individual states. 
Here, from the failure of the EDC, the very first effort of the Western 
European towards establishing a union, it can be said that the European states at that 
time were approaching to the idea of the EU through neorealist ideas because they 
saw the international community as anarchic and full of chaotic relations with no one 
to trust in. Also, the states' sovereignty was the number one value on their security 
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policies.48 The main threat during the Cold W ar was the SU and the main instrument 
to dea! with it was NATO, a neorealist collective defense organization. EU was under 
NATO, not independent of NATO; it could not construct an independent security 
culture/identity away from NATO. 
In 1949, the USA, Canada, and ten other states have signed the North 
Atlantic Treaty and formed NATO. The main task of NATO was to eliminate the 
communist threat trough a collective defense force. 
Europeans, however, were aware of the fact that they had different threat 
perceptions other than the communist threat such as a possible German aggression and 
the rifts between the USA and France. France was opposed to the idea of 'United 
States ofEurope'. France wanted an integrated Europe without control of the USA but 
stili European Community did not seem to be fully integrated because the states were 
reluctant to the idea of attaching themselves into a supranational organization. 
The second development on the way to collective security of Europe was the 
establishment of the European Coal and Steel Company of 1951 with Paris Treaty. 
ECSC can be claimed to be the roots of the EU. It was rnainly an economic-based 
community that could rebuild the destroyed infrastructure and facilities. The USA, 
throughout the Cold War steadily supported the economic integration and 
improvement of the Europe as a whole, the Western Europe actually. After all, the 
USA needed a trade partner and a strong ally against the communist threat. 
48 Jolyon Howorth, 'European Integration and Defense: The U!timate Challenge?' Chail/ot Papers, 
No: 43, Paris: EU Institute for Security Studies, November 2000, p. 9, http://www.iss-
eu.org/chaillot/chai43e.html. 
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It should be pointed that the USA has been very supportive of European 
integration. Many authorities have considered this intense closeness of the USA 
saying that the EU was an American project at all. There were two main policies for 
the security of the EU. The fırst was through NATO, neorealist security cooperation 
against a military external threat. And the second was the European integration, a 
liberal constructivist project. Thus, the security dimension of the integration was 
crucial. The USA both wanted European states to be secure against each other through 
inercasing cooperation and also she saw the EU as an ally. 
Although the EDC failed, the European powers were still willing to establish 
an organization against the Soviet and German threats. In 1951, they founded the 
Western European Union, WEU, which again took the principles of 1948 Brussels 
Treaty as the main principles of the Union. The WEU was still secondary to NATO in 
military and defense terms. West Germany, thanks to her membership in WEU 
integrated into NATO in 1955 after the Korean War.49 
However, the WEU also failed to create an integrated Europe in security and 
defense terms. The main impediment in front of the common security policy was the 
lack of the technological and military capabilities. The USA was undoubtedly very 
improved in security terms. She was spending a large part of her GDP for security 
while European states were not that generous in doing so. Also, the debates between 
the UK and France were so harsh. France was skeptical about any control by the USA 
or Britain, which she saw as the number one ally and pnppet of the USA. France was 
in support of a European Community under French leadership and separated from 
NATO in all terms. NATO, for France, was a tool of American Containment Policy. 
49 John Kent and John W. Young, 'British Policy Overseas: The Third Force and the Origins of 
NATO in Search ofa New Perspective' in B. Heuser aud R. O'Neill, eds., Securing Peace in Europe 
1945-196~ London,p.43. 
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However, the reality was that without the USA, Europe could not have stayed safe 
against the coınmunist threat. The USA did not fight two major wars in her !and so 
devastatingly and she got ri c her after the two wars. 50 
The WEU became operational only in terms of economic integration. In the 
context of security, it could only help control the German military equipments and 
prevent a probable German aggression. However, it failed to implement a coınmon 
foreign and security policy. NATO remained as the main and only tool to provide and 
keep security and peace in Europe. 
With the end of the Stalinİst period in the Soviet Union, a detente period had 
begun in ı 960s with Khrushchev and Nixon in the world. The huge threat of nuclear 
war was stili alive but some sort of predictability and stability were present in term 
starting from 1960s.51 
By ı 960s, it was clear that Europe was a huge economic power. Also, thanks 
to the European states' relations with the former colonies, European states were 
powerful in diplomatic terms, too. However, they were not building these good 
relationships as a Union, but as individual states. The US infinence was stili heavy but 
the Europeans started to be suspicious about the US capability of preventing a Soviet 
nuclear threat and also they were not happy from the situation of being dependent on 
the USA for security. The Europeans were also of the view that harsh American 
attitudes towards the Soviet Union could put Europe's own relations with the Soviets 
into jeopardy. The Westem Europeans did not want to be captive of the United States' 
problems with the Soviet Union. However, their defense capabilities were low and 
50 Ibid. 
51 Adrian G. V. Hyde-Price, European Security Beyand the Cold W ar. London: SAGE Publ., 1991, pp. 
32-4. 
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they knew they had to rely on the USA. In order to feel safer, get rid of the US 
infinence and become a major player, European states started to think seriously about 
a collective defense system. 
1950's Korean War was a proof of Europeans' powerless defense 
capabilities. lt was always the USA who could send more number of troops and 
military equipment when there was a conflict or war. NATO was present with 
numerous troops in European territories and Europe recognized the fact that they had 
to be more powerful in terms of defense. They understood that their military spending 
was insufficient. 52 
Starting from 1960s, European states demanded that NATO should have a 
separate 'European' part which was going to be led by Europeans and practice 
according to the European initiatives.53 The USA also wanted a strong Westem 
Europe who cooperated in defense terms. After all, the Soviet threat and the 
Communist Bloc required to be opposed by strong allies. 
In 1968, Westem European states founded Euro Group. The main purpose 
behind the establishment of it was cooperation in terms of the use of military 
equipment when necessary. Still, Europeans were aware that their military capabilities 
were not sufficient against Soviets and they hesitated to make Americans decrease the 
number of their troops in European territories. Ironically, the USA also di d not want 
an integrated, collective European security system; all she wanted to see was a 
52 Kenneth B. Moss, NATO 's 50 Years, http://www.shape.nato.int/COMMUNITY_LIFE/1999. 
53 Jolyon Howorth, 'European Integration and Defense: The Ultimate Challenge?' Chaillot Papers, No: 
43, Paris: EU Institute for Security Studies, November 2000, p. 9, http://www.iss-
eu.org/chaillot/chai43e.html. 
46 
cooperative Europe so that she would continue to seli more armament to the 
• 54 contınent. 
In 1969, the European powers came together in The Hague and decided ona 
political cooperation which came into force after three years as the European Political 
Cooperation, EPC. The European powers decided to act together on political terms. 
This meant that Europe, after integrated economically, was starting to be integrated in 
political terms, too. Europe was very desirous towards being a major actor in world 
politics. And they knew that as individual states, they would be ineffective and 
insecure. The EPC was going to provide for solidarity, communication, order anda 
road to common culture. 55 
The detente term starting from the early 1960s culminated in the middle of 
1970s. In 1973, European powers came together in Helsinki where they organized a 
Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, which later will be the second 
pillar of the EU as Common Foreign and Security Policy. The Helsinki Final Act of 
1975 was an important development for the politico-military integration of Europe 
with its principles of cooperation in security, defense, and political, educational, 
economic and social fıelds. 56 It should be pointed, though; cooperation was not 
enough for integration and collectivity. 
The 1980s saw important developments on the way to collective foreign and 
security policy in Europe. In 1984, the European states and NATO members reached 
54 Gulnur Aybet, The Dynamics of European Security Cooperation, 1945-1991, London: MacMillan, 
1997, pp. 121-3. 
55 Panaitos Ifestos, 'European Political Cooperation: Toward a Framework for Supranational 
Dip,lomacy?', Aldershot, 1987, pp. 148-52. 
6 Adrian G. V. Hyde-Price, European Security Beyand the Co/d W ar, London: SAGE Publ., 1991, 
pp. 35-7. 
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on an agreement to make the European part of NA TO more powerful. WEU was 
revived in 1984. The beginning of the 1980s saw many erisis situations in the world 
such as Iranian Revolution and the Afghan invasion of the SU. Such developments 
forced both NATO and the EU to get more powerful. NATO created the Rapid 
Deployment Joint Task Force in order to be more responsive and successful in erisis 
ı . d 57 reso utıon an management. 
Gorbachev's term in the Soviet Union, starting in March 1985, provided 
further stabi1ity and detente in the East-W et relations. Mikhail Gorbachev proposed to 
decrease the investment on armament mutually since it was absurd to increase the 
armament while that huge amount of money could have been utilized to increase the 
welfare of the states. 
In 1987, Dutch officials demanded from the WEU that it should be a solid 
body that can and should work for solutions to the Iran-Iraq War, which started in 
1980 and later the Gulf W ar which broke out in 1991. As resnit of such willingness of 
European states to act as one cooperative body resulted in the nava1 blackade of Iraq 
in 1990. 
However, despite all these attempts of cooperation, it could be claimed that 
both the EDC and the WEU were very far away from contributing to the collective 
security organization of Europe. For the rest of the Cold W ar, Europe's security and 
foreign policy decisions were almost made by the USA. We can count the distinct 
policy choices of Britain, France and West Germany as the main cause of the failure 
57 NATO Handbook, 50/h Anniversary Edition, Brussels: NATO Office oflnfornıation and Press, 
1998, p. 331. 
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of a common security system. Britain was on the si de of the USA, trusting in NATO 
and US-!ed secnrity po!icies. All in all, Britain never believedin a Europe who had all 
the arrangements for a concrete collective secnrity policy and tools to practice such 
po!icies. Also, Britain, being one of the major powers throughout history, did not 
decline to be an ordinary European state in the world of states; she wanted to remain 
as a major power in world politics and believed that this was only possible through 
being a member of NATO and an ally of the USA. 
On the other hand, France was not in favor of the US-led Europe and wanted a 
Europe whose members cooperated on all political, economical, foreign policy and 
secnrity issues. Such cooperation would also help asa resistance to the US hegemony. 
French offıcials strongly believed that NATO was just another tool of the USA to 
contain Europe. 
West Germany was very resentful after the two great wars, having to pay 
heavy reparations and left with a minimized militaristic force. She was also heavily 
dependent on the United States.58 In contrary to French wishes about a European army 
with no intervention from the USA, West Germany was in favor of aNATO-hased 
security system for Euro pe. 59 
Therefore, with Britain, France and West Germany being separated from each 
other in terms of their ideas about secnrity policies, Westem Europe had failed to 
establish an organization which was independent and powerful enough to produce a 
58 G. Wyn Rees, 'Britain and the Westem European Union', European Security, vol. 5, no. 4, Winter, 
ı 996, p. 530. 
59 Tom Lansford, 'The Question ofFrance: French Security Choices at Century' s End', European 
Security 5, no. ı, Spring ı 996, p. 44. 
49 
collective foreign and security policy. S he had to remain under the infinence and 
protection of the United States for the rest of the Cold W ar. 
Thus, during the Cold War era, Europe remained asa cooperative but not an 
integrated Union. As the second chapter discussed, European Union seemed to be in 
compliance with the pluralist approach since the individual members saw their 
sovereignty and national identity distinct from that of the Union. No collective pan-
European identity could be constructed throughout the Cold War. The idea of 
supranationalism came almost intirnidating to the states !ike France and Britain. 
During the Co id W ar, Westphalian idea of nation-state was stili important. 
3.2. Security Policies of the Western Europe in the Post Co/d W ar Period 
The dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991 marked the beginning of a brand 
new term for an improved, col!ective European security and foreign policy. When the 
Cold War frnished, the world ceased to be bipolar; West and East Germany united, 
former Soviet states gained independence and were moving towards democratization 
that started with Perestroika. The USA gave up the containment policy. The old super 
powers were not competing for more sphere of infinence any more. Europe had 
enlarged in geographical and political terms. The world became a multi-polar world 
with new regional, important powers. However, the end of the Cold W ar did not mean 
more security; although a nuclear strike was not likely to break out, there were 
nurnerous powers with military force in every region. Europe, after the Co id W ar, had 
to dea! with the Eastem European states' process of democratization, ethnic confiicts, 
so 
international terrorism, enviromnental problems, illegal traff'icking and also nuclear 
armament by the rogue states.60 
The issue of security has accelerated the foreign policy integration of the EU 
because of the following reasons. First of all, they have seen that in the absence of 
Soviet threat the need to continue the integration process became more important. 
Secondly, they recognized that the USA might cease to act as "the European pacifier". 
What would happen if the US commitment to European security decreased? Would 
the EU members prove to be capable of providing their own security in the absence of 
the United States? Thirdly, an integrated Gerınany had to be controlled that she should 
not follow unilateral policies; hence CFSP and ESDP were important and beneficial. 
Fourthly, it was important to be integrated and powerful for the EU in order to be seen 
serious in international relations by the USA, the sole super power of the world. 
Finally, the EU had to be integrated through CFSP and ESDP in order to be a global 
actor and deal with the threats around it. 
The very first important cooperative action of the WEU was the naval 
b lockade of Iraq in 1990. This action demonstrated that the European states, if acted 
cooperatively, would be of greater importance in world politics and have more say in 
their foreign security policy decisions. However, there were stil! impediments to the 
unification because while Britain was continuing her attempts to link the WEU to 
NATO, French officials were strongly against an organization under the US influence. 
60 Viktor-Yves Ghebal, Brigitte Saurwein, European Security in the 1990s: Challenges and 
Perspectives, Geneva: UN Institute for Disannament Research, 1995, p. 11-2. 
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Eventually, in 1992, Maastricht Treaty, the Treaty of the European Union, was signed 
and caıne into force in 1993.61 
The main pillar of the Treaty of the European Union was CFSP. It should be 
pointed that at fırst, this pillar was not strong and effective because the members were 
stili reluctant to a common policy on defense and foreigo relations; they perceived 
these as a breach of sovereignty. Also, it was very hard to reach an agreement between 
the members when the decision-making process arrives. In order to reach a decision to 
intervene in a region they had to agree with a qualifıed majority but it was very hard 
to provide such majority-vote. Every state had veto-rights that if one of the states 
objected to the intervention or action, then the proposal would automatically be 
annulled. But most importantly, even if a foreigo policy decision was reached, there 
was no unifıed, single army to make the intervention. But stili, it could be claimed that 
with Maastricht, Europe started to get rid of the influence of NATO and thus the 
The members of the European Union gathered in Petersberg in 1992 and 
decided on the three main functions of the WEU, which were: militaristk duties when 
peace is in danger, humanitarian duties of protecting the civilians from any kind of 
conflicts and coping with the crises. It was emphasized that all the actions and 
decisions of the WEU were going to be carried out according to the accountability 
principle and the UN Charter articles. 63 
61 Gu1nur Aybet, A European Security Architecture after the Co/d W ar, New York: St. Martin's Press, 
2000, pp. 97-115. 
62 George Stein, 'The Euro-Corps and Future European Security Architecture', European Security, 2, 
no. 2, Surumer 1993, p. 200-13. 
63 Western European Union Council ofMinisters, Petersberg Dec1aration, Bonn, 19 June 1992, http: 
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After the end of the Cold W ar, the states and authorities began to question 
the presence of NATO since the Soviet tbreat had been eliminated. Therefore, NATO 
issued Rom e Declaration in 1991, clarifying that it was go ing to remain as revised in 
order to provide order and peace in all political, economical, environmental and social 
terms. NATO ended its military base in Germany. Later, France and Germany united 
their forces and established a European Rapid Reaction Force which had the tasks of 
defense, peace keeping and humani tarian aids. The actions and decisions of Eurocorps 
were in compliance with the provisions ofBrussels Treaty, bence they could intervene 
the outside fields of Europe, too. The main question that arose in minds was how 
NATO and Eurocorps were going to co-exist. Franco-German answer to this question 
was that Eurocorps constituted no tbreat for NAT0.64 In order to end the disputes, 
French, German Defense Ministers, NATO Defense Planning Commitlee and Council 
agreed that Eurocorps were the prior defense unit of the European Union.65 
NATO's 1994 Sununit in Brussels concluded that the WEU is permitted to 
utilize NATO military equipments and headquarters when a European action is 
concemed. This principle was narned as Combined Joint Task Force, CJTF. The 
notion of CJTF was about combining the forces of NATO, WEU and non-WEU 
members in order to make and keep peace. However, France again opposed this idea. 
Also, France demanded that the WEU should apply to NATO's military equipments 
whenever it needed.66 In contrary to France, Britain supported for CJTF. France 
64 Joanne Wright, 'France and European Security', European Security, vol. 2, no. 1, Spring 1993, p. 
39. 
65 George Stein, 'The Euro-Corps and Future European Security Architecture', European Security, 2, 
no. 2, Sunnner 1993, p. 215. 
66 Jbid, pp. 73-75. 
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reached a compromise with NATO Council in 1995 and in 1996; CJTF came into 
force ina modifıed form. 67 
Starting from the end of the Cold War, the disputes between France and the 
United Kingdom were coming to an end. France reformed her relations with NATO 
and accepted NATO's strength and importance for European security. Also, the UK 
became more desirous towards a European defense unity. In 1996, the parties came 
together in Berlin and reached an agreement that there should be a distinct European 
pillar within NATO framework. They were trying to build a European Security and 
Defense identity, ESDI.68 ESDI was not independent from NATO but it was only an 
additional force of the Europeans alongside NATO in order to carry out Petersberg 
tasks.69 
The turning point for the EU' s collective security po li eyeand integration 
came with Saint MaJo Declaration, issued in 1998, and Jater Cologne and Helsinki 
Summits of 1999. They were a turning point for the establislıınent of a unified, 
powerful European security system. Europe was almost reshaped starting from the 
mid-1990s thanks to the new government established by Tony Blair government in the 
United Kingdom. The United Kingdom was no more reluctant to a united Europe. 
Another important reason why Europe started to think seriously about a 
collective security organization was Kosovo War of 1999. During the war, it was the 
67 David S. Yost, NATO Transformed the Alliance 's New Roles in International Security, 
Washington: USIP Press, 1998, p. 397. 
68 Simon Duke, 'European Security and Defense Identity' in Ulrike Schurnacher and Peter Lang eds., 
Structure, Order, Disorder in World Politics: Conjlicts, Options, Strategies ina Threatened World, 
1998,pp. 120-1. 
69 Stanley R. Sloan, 'The United States and European Defense' Chaillot Papers, No. 39, Paris: EU 
Institute for Security Studies, April2000, p. 12, http://www.iss-eu.org/chaillot/chai39e.html. 
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USA who provided all the military equipments, information, humanitarian aid and 
protection of the civilians, not the WEU. 70 Hence, European states realized that they 
have to be united in order to be powerful, secure and helpful to the civilians and other 
states. They discovered that they lacked both the practical and ideological unity in 
order to carry out their principal tasks of humanitarian aids, peacekeeping and 
environmental protection. Without a common foreign and security policy and a 
military, Europe was nothing; no power at all. 
The fina! reason that made Europe notice its inferiority in defense and 
security issues was that the military industrial complexes of European states were 
also secondary to those of the USA. If not acted as a unity, the European states, as 
individual states, would be nothing compared to the USA. It was as simple as this: 
European states had to be integrated around a common foreign and security policy 
and should have a unifıed, powerful military to be able to intervene and operate 
when necessary. 71 
With 1998 Saint Malo Declaration, Europeans announced that a collective 
security and foreign policy was required. Britain seemed no more as a Euro-skeptic, 
Atlanticİst European member anymore. Rather, Blair called for a common security 
policy of Europe. It was clear that Europe had to be independent from NATO, start to 
act as one, outside the infinence of in order to be a major power. Even if there were 
still some minor disagreements between Britain and France, an important step had 
been moved through Blair' s statements. Because before 1998 British officials were 
always in favor of the participation of NATO in European affairs in order to have a 
70 Peter Van Ham, 'Europe's Common Defense Policy: Implications for the Trans-Atlantic 
Relationship', Security Dialogue, 31, no. 2, 2000, p. 216. 
71 Margarita Mathiopulos and ıstvan Gyannati, 'Saint Mal o and Beyoncl: Toward European Defense', 
The Washington Quarterly22, no. 4, Autumn 1999, p. 67-8. 
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more secure Europe. However, France was constantly emphasizing a fully 
independent EU from both NATO and the USA. French officials were confıdent about 
the capabilities of the EU of operating without any support from NA TO. 72 
In St. Malo, Jacques Chirac and Tony Blair agreed that common foreign and 
security policy is a must for the EU. All 15 members of the Union, including the 
former indifferent states, agreed that there should be a collective foreign and security 
policy-making through collective organizations and establishments. They also agreed 
that the EU should readily intervene when there is a erisis around the world, rather 
than leaving crisis-management-issues to NATO. 73 
The Declaration of St. Malo attracted the US officials' attention. The US 
officials tended to eriticize the Europeans' efforts to construct a unity in security terms 
because they believed that Europe lacked the necessary military force when an 
intervention was decided to be implemented. The point is that NATO was ready to 
intervene with its enormous military capabilities and experience while European states 
were lacking experience and material requirements. Thus, Americans demanded from 
Europeans to invest on military more, waming them about the three D's of 
"Duplication, Decoupling and Discrimination". 74 Duplication meant that it was a 
waste for Europe to invest on military more when NA TO was present and ready to do 
what Europeans intend to do. With 'decoupling', the USA wanted cooperation with 
the EU within the NATO framework, not a separated Union. Finally, with 
72 Peter Van Ham, 'Europe's Common Defense Policy: lmplications for the Trans-Atlantic 
Relationship', Security Dialogue, 31, no. 2, 2000, p. 217. 
73 Margarita Mathiopulos and ıstvan Gyarmati, 'Saint MaJo and Beyond: Toward European Defense', 
The Washington Quarterly22, no. 4, Autumn 1999, p. 68-9. 
74 Madeleine K. Albright and William Cohen, 'Washington's View: Get ESDI Right- Europe Should 
Beefup !ts Military Capabilities', W all Street Journal, March 24, 2000. 
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'discrimination' Madeleine Albright was emphasizing there should be no 
discrimination between the EU aud non-EU members. Discrimination is especially 
importaut here because Turkey was a non-EU member. The US officials claimed that 
a united European security policy would exclude mauy other world states such as 
Turkey, Arneri cas, Asiau countries, ete ... aud thus it would not be effective, at all.75 
The main proof of the EU remaining incapable of acting as a credible security 
actor in its own enviromnent was the EU' s failure in the Kosovo erises in the early 
1999. The conflict came to end with the active US involvement. The EU stayed muted 
aud could not implement a coherent policy towards auy erisis until then. 
As Europe were working hard to be a solid unity, NATO tried not to lose its 
influence on the EU through providing Europe with militaristic equipments aud 
necessary assets, as declared in 1999 NATO Sununit The next importaut 
development in European CFSP came with the Helsinki European Council Sununit of 
1999. The member states enlarged the rnilitary capabilities of the EU; there were 
go ing to be 15 brigades ready, with support from the air aud sea, to take action when a 
task introduced by Petersburg meeting. The brigades were going to have the ability to 
plau aud operate alone with their own recounaissauce system aud intelligence 
abilities. They decided that when NATO did not engage in au operationasa whole, 
the EU was going to intervene aud resolve the erises or preserve peace ifnecessary.76 
Helsinki Sununit did not create a powerful aud unified European Army but 
still it created a system, which should be ready to take action when a erisis arises. But 
75 Stanley R. Sloan, 'The United States and European Defense' Chaillot Papers, No. 39, Paris: EU 
Institute for Security Studies, April2000, p. 17, http://www.iss-eu.org/chaillot/chai39e.html. 
76 Alexander Moens, 'Developing a European Iutervention Force', International Journal, Spring, 
2000, p. 264. 
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stili, NATO was always there, with a huge militaristic capacity, ready to intervene and 
solve the crises. Helsinki Summit also did not result in an allowance for the EU to be 
absolutely free to benefit from the equipments and assets of NATO. It was stili a 
NATO initiative whether to Jet the EU utilize i ts assets. 77 
In addition, it should be also highlighted that the EU did not only try to 
provide its security by founding CFSP and ESDP, but it also tried to accelerate and 
made the integration process irreversible. Moreover it also tried to spread its values 
and norrns to the candidate countries. The EU was also ambitious to convert the 
peripheral countries according to its identity and values. 
77 Peter Van Ham, 'Europe's Common Defense Policy: Implications for the Trans-Atlantic 
Relationship', Security Dialogue, 31, no. 2, 2000, p. 219; Alexander Moens, 'Developing a European 
Intervention Force', International Journal, Spring, 2000, p. 264. 
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3.3. European Security U nderstanding after 9111 
European states gained a great dea! of conscience after the US World Trade 
Center and Pentagon were hit by terrorists. 9/1112001 was a milestone for the who le 
world of states. The international community knew that overall secırrity degree had 
diminished dramatically for the world. 
]After ll September, following issues began to be more important 
considering the security of the EU. EU began to pay much more attention to any event 
that takes place in the Middle East and North Africa. The reason why the EU has 
began to consider these regions in a more serious way is that these regions are not 
only close to Europe but also there is an immense migration to this continent from the 
above mentioned territories. Moreover there is a huge Muslim population living in 
European countries. 
As a result of security concerns stemming from these regions the EU has 
accelerated its efforts in order to convert norms and values of these regions. For this 
purposes some initiatives such as Mediterranean Program, Interfaithlinter-civilizations 
Dialogue was put into practice. Detailed agreements were sigued with almost all of 
those countries. The reason laying behind these initiatives was to build good-
governance in the related regions so that formation of terrorist organizations can be 
prevented. 
The characteristics of the relation between the EU and the USA also gained 
importance. The relations to be established with the USA became more important than 
ever for the security purposes of the EU. In such a situation some vital questions 
revealed !ike the following. Should the EU strictly follow the USA based policies or 
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had it better begin to search for new models and altematives? Is the USA trying to 
weaken the EU by causing con:flicts among the members of the union? Do the policies 
of the US towards the Middle East raise the security threats for the EU? In the post-ll 
September era, European leaders began to deal with such questions more seriously. 
Here, it can be concluded that they are stili in search of answers. 
In this case, Turkey's prospective membership to the EU became more 
signifıcant for the security concems of the latter. The way the EU regards Turkey 
became in:fluential for the success of European policies related to the Muslim world. 
The EU authorities question whether Turkey's membership to the union can be 
suffıcient for the credibility of the EU upon the region or whether her membership 
would affect the newly enlarged union in a negative way and slow dowu the 
integration process of the EU. 
In the context of the EU, most of the Europeans were disapproval of Bush 
administration' s policies. Iraq invasion was probably the culmination of the US 
govemment's aggressive policies. Bush' s war against terrorism did not help mute the 
terrorists and create democratic states in the Middle East, but it caused more feelings 
and sitnations of insecurity around the world. EU members, seriously, recognized that 
they have to transform the union in a way that it wouid become powerful and unifıed 
enough to deal with the US policies and not fail to intervene if necessary. 78 Europe 
saw that EU was far from being a major player in world politics so European states 
began to reform the EU. 
78 Cristopher Flood, Some European Thoughts in the Wake of9/ll, South Central Review, Vol. 19, 
No. 2/3, 9/11, Summer-Autumn 2002, pp. 51-4. 
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In 2003, 12 December, the EU issued the European Security Strategy 
document for "A Secure Europe in a Better World" in Brussels. The members 
declared terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, regional conflicts, 
failed states and organized erime as the key security issues. They decided on the 
adoption of a "European Arrest W arrant" and strengthen the International Atomic 
Energy Agency. The main point was that in the era of globalization, they decided to 
build a stronger and secure Europe in order not to be vulnerable to the erises and 
terrorism. They declared that the Cold W ar was over and the threat perception was not 
the fear of being invaded any more. The world has changed, so did the threat 
perceptions and security understandings. They decided to be more "active" with 1 60b 
Euro spending on defense expenditures; they also decided to make the military 
capability more flexible, mobile and effective. The NATO-EU cooperation was said to 
be benefidal for such a powerful militaristk capability.79 
The EU enlarged geographically and is continuing to do so, it has a single 
currency, it has a great economic power and it is successful in helping the countries 
experiencing crisis. The EU is good at carrying out humanitarian aid, but it is not 
when it comes to military intervention and protection of the civil population when a 
erisis or invasion take place, as we saw in Iraq and also in the recent Lebanon crisis. It 
fails to intervene and avoid the civilians' losses because it is not a unity that is capable 
of deciding as one and interverring with an army. 
The rejection of the European Constitution draft by France and the Netherlands 
was also an indication to the diffıculty of European states forming a coherent, 
79 A Secure Europe ForaSetter World, 
http://ue.eu.int/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf#search~%22european%20security%20strategy%22 
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power:ful unity. The member-states are stili in favor of sovereignty, national identity, 
unwilling of the membership of other poor and crowded countries. The criteria set by 
Copenhagen Sununit complicate the membership process to the EU much more. 
Turkey is also striving to implement the social, economic and political practices 
demanded by the Copenhagen Criteria. Instructions of membership are getiing harder 
and unifıcation through a common constitution seems to be impossible. Europe does 
not seem to be powerful enough to challenge the United States for now. The irony is 
that Europeans know that they can stop the USA if unifıed; however, they are afraid 
oflosing their own identity and sovereignty. 
European states' attempt and anxiety to develop a coherent, common foreign 
and security policy along with a multinational army, was a dissatisfaction for the USA 
because if a powerful, unifıed Europe existed, US-led NATO would lose importance, 
the USA would cease to be the sole super-power of the world, Bush would have to 
end his arbitrary policy decisions, and commercially, too, the USA would be badly 
wounded. Briefly, with a power:ful Europe, the USA would have to give up the 
Icadership of the world. The three D's were an implication of the USA's 
unwillingness of a strong EU. 
3.4. Conclusion 
From all these developments and points, it can be concluded that Europe, 
although it could establish an economically power:ful union wbich is good at 
humanitarian aid and significantly important in world trade and diplomacy, has not 
established a multinational army that is able to intervene and operate, yet. However, 
the Helsinki Sununit has been an important move towards the foundation of such a 
multinational army since it has declared that the EU is capable of having such a large 
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militaristic force to carry out Petersburg tasks. After all, erisis management was 
adopted by the European states as the number one task. It is also seen that all the 
impediments on the way to the unification in terms of a common foreign and security 
policy are being solved one by one as the situation of Nordic countries was regulated 
successfully. 
Although there are such developments and achievements on one hand, on the 
other, we have various problems and deadlocks that the European states have to taekle 
with in order to be a strong unity. First of all, Europe is extremely inexperienced about 
militaristic intervention and erisis resolution. Both in technological and militaristic 
terms, Europe is secondary to the USA. As we take the diminishing European 
investment on armament, the future does not bring enough hope for a technologically 
and numerously powerful, multinational army for Europe. Secondly, European states, 
traditionally, do not seem to form a coherent unity and give up their sovereignty in 
favor of a supranational organization. Each state is of different language, culture, 
having distinct national goals and ideologies. There are a significant number of Euro-
skeptics who want to protect the status quo and not !et the EU become superior to the 
individual govermnents. The rejection of the European Constitution well proves this 
fact. However, it is a fact that the EU has to be a supra-national organization in order 
to practice a common foreign and security policy that will be the guarantee of its 
power, major player role in the world politics and a challenger to the USA. If 
remained intergovernmental, the EU will suffer from slow decision-making process, 
be a scene of disagreements and deadlocks, remain as powerless and not go any 
further than being an economic power. Another impediment on the way to a powerful 
EU is that European states' policy makers want to avoid militaristic spending as much 
as they can since all European Union members are welfare states. 
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The Iraq invasion, the rejection of the Constitution and the recent Lebanon 
erisis demonstrate clearly that Europe has stili a long way to go but also they show 
that Europe has to achleve getting unifıed and being one, applying a common foreign 
and security policy in order to be a major player in world politics. Economic unity is 
not enough for the EU to be powerful in politics. September ll changed the world 
security picture undeniably and Europe has to and/or will have to face this truth as 
soon as possible. 
The question of whether Europe possesses an independent common security 
identity and culture from those of the USA the individual European states can be 
answered that Europe has not constructed such apan-European collective identity but 
she is on her way to create one. The European states, we stated, had to cooperate and 
integrate in order to be a major international and regional power, end the US 
superiority and eliminate the ethnic, national conflicts, environmental threats, nuclear 
armarnent proliferation, the instability the rogue states of the Middle East and the 
former Soviet states experience, the illegal traffıcking of the Eastern Europeans, 
illegal immigration and so on. Many of the threat perceptions of the EU are not 
perceived as threat by the USA. Europe, in order to eliminate her threat perceptions, is 
improving the cooperation among her members. Cooperation, however, is not enough 
for EU if she wants to be a major power and eliminate all security threats she has to 
dea! with. A collective pan-European identity has to be constructed through a 
European military and common foreign and security policy, only if done so; Europe 
can be a major player in world politics. 
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CHAPTERIII 
THE EVOLUTION OF TURKEY'S SECURITY CULTURE IN 
LINE WITH THE EU ACCESSION PROCESS 
In this chapter, Tnrkey's secnrity understanding from Tanzimat to the 
present day will be examined particularly in the light of the changes that have taken 
place during the Enropeanization process .. It will be seen what the place of the EU 
and the West in Kemalist principles is. Another goal is to demonstrate that Tnrkey' s 
secnrity understanding made it diffıcult for her to make the reforms that the EU 
accession process has demanded. 
The question is how the EU integration process has affected the threat 
perceptions, security identity and secnrity policies of Tnrkey. Another important 
question is whether the EU membership process has diminished Tnrkey' s secnrity or 
not. 
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4.1. Main Characteristics ofTnrkey's Security Culture 
4.1.1. Importance ofGeography and Geopolitics in Turkey's Security 
Culture 
Traditionally, Turkey could feel herself secure as long as she feels 
herselfas a part of Europe, the West. For Turkey, a homogenous and unitary state 
idea has been the basis of her security. Secularism was a constitutive element of 
Turkey' s security cultnre. Turkey perceived multicultnralism, federal state order and 
Islamic states as threats. Until 1990s, Turkey and the EU did not have any dispute 
over these issues. The end of the Cold W ar, however, was going to change the 
secnrity relations between the two. 
The geopolitical richness that Turkey possesses is capable of carrying her not 
only to a role of regional power but also a major power in a globalized world. 
Turkish borders are located ona key point of the world: she is in the middle of three 
different continents: Europe, Asia and Africa; she has the Caucasus in the north, 
Balkans in the west, the Arab World and Israel in the south and east; she has costs to 
the Mediterranean and Black Sea, which means she is, simultaneously, counted as a 
major power in four regions. As this is the case, Turkey has to have a very good 
intelligence and diplamatic staff who are capable of adapting her into the new 
system of international and regional communities when necessary. The goals of 
international community and the security understandings are changeable, thus 
Turkey is one of the key actors who have to be ready to adjust to the new system 
and survive. 
When we analyze the histarical background of Anatolia, we would easily see 
that this particular !and has always attracted the masses, Byzantine, Seljukis, the 
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Ottomans have all chosen Anatolia as their home because it was a fact that Anatolia, 
geographically and politically, was a key strategic po int for all these states. It can be 
claimed that, Anatolia' s geography is also a curse because it had been invaded and 
pinndered many times throughout the history.80 Although the sea borders make 
Turkey very fragile to the attacks from outside, the eastem part of Anatolia makes it 
hard for the enemy to invade because Anatolia is surrounded by enormously high 
mountains in the east with very hard climate conditions. Briefly, Turkey, with its 
powerful mountainous, natural defense in the east and fragile, powerless insecurity 
on the straits and her powerful militaristic power, is of great concem for 
international security studies. 81 
Another reason why geography occupies a vital place in Turkey's security 
identity is that nearly all of Turkey' s neighbors gained their independence fol!owing 
the end of the Ottoman Empire and covet on Turkey's territory. The countries with 
which Turkey has borders tend to interpret the Ottoman ruie as a colonial experience 
and they tend to regard Turkey as the heir of the Ottoman Empire and Turkey has to 
defend i tse if against many rivals at the very same time. 
4.1.2. Role of the Turkish Armed Forces 
Traditionally speaking, the role of the Turkish militaristic force was of vital 
importance for a solid, successful security policy of Turkey. Even though military is 
not that important at the moment as it was during the democratization process in the 
early Republican era and until the very beginning of the new millennium, military 
8° F. Vali, Bridges across the Bosphorus, the Foreign Policy o/Turkey, Baltiınore: The Jolıns 
Hopkins University Press, p. 46, 1971. 
81 M. Aydın, 'Deterıninants of Turkish Foreign Policy: Historical Fraınework and Traditional Inputs', 
Middle Eastern Studies, 1999, 35/4, pp. 152-65. 
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can be claimed to be the backbone of the Turkish security and a guarantee to the 
survival of the regime and the state. The importance of the Turkish Armed Forces 
stems from the fact that the militaristic forces were both the founders of the Ottoman 
Empire and the Turkish Republic. Throughout its history there has been always a 
close relation with the nation and the army. Basic policies, institutions and actual 
agendas of the country have always been determined by the army. Turkey had 
experienced two coup d'etats in 1960 and 1980 and a semi-coup d'etat in 1971. 
Military, despite having been criticized sometimes for its heavy influence on 
Turkish political environment it is the most respectable institution in the eyes of 
Turkish people due to the fact that it succeeded to remain as unpoliticized, 
respectable, and incorruptible while the people, officials, even the police, were/are 
divided and polarized. 82 
The unique feature of Turkish security culture is that neither civilians nor the 
military powers play the leading role. However, the role of the civilians has 
increased from the second half of 1990s in paraHel to the acceleration of Turkey's 
accession process with the EU. After all, the civilian decision makers still perceive 
the militaristic force as the main security tool. It is undeniable that in order to have a 
proper deterrence system, one has to possess an intimidating militaristic force. 
Deterrence may be claimed to be the first step of security alongside a power:ful 
intelligence service. Hence, the respect of society, the political actors' dependence 
on military in order to provide security and the traditional background of Turkey 
point to the important role of military in Turkey's national security. Military is stili 
82 Dankwart A. Rustow, 'The Military in Turkey' in D. A. Rustow and D. E. Robert (eds), Poltical 
Modernization in .!apan and Turkey, Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1964, pp. 
352-88; W. Hale, The Political and Economic Development of Modern Turkey, London: Croom 
Helm, 198 I; George S. Harris, 'The Role ofMilitary in Turkish Politics', Middle East Journal, 1965, 
19/1' pp. 50·66. 
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the body that is making the decisions behind the scenes. 83 Military officials of 
National Security Council assume that the civilian authority is inferior to the 
military. The secularist, nationalist, republicau aud integrative principles of Atatürk 
could only be restored thanks to the military. 84 
Even though democracy was paralyzed by military interventions, NSC was 
insistent on the fact that the country was face to face with domestic enemies. The 
public enemy number one was Islamİst fundamentalists aud two was the divisive 
Kurdish nationalists. Radical Islamists aud Kurds were declared as the main target 
by the National Security Council in 1997 with the international threats were 
assumed as Greece in the West because of the Aegeau islauds aud Syria in the south 
because of her supportive policy for the separatist terrorists. Later, nationalİst mafia 
was added onto this black list in 1999.85 Such steps taken by the military force 
regarding the security policy of Turkey in 1990s cau be given as good examples to 
highlight the role of the armed forces play in the formation ofTurkey's security 
culture. Weren't it for the military forces, radical Islamism aud separatist Kurdish 
movement might have not been included to the security agenda of Turkey. 
As the revisionist approach has claimed, Turkey, as au underdeveloped 
country, had to rest on its militaristic power because she at fırst had to eliminate the 
auti-regime aud separatist movements in the inside. Domestic clashes aud conflicts 
had been the number one threat for Turkey for decades even though her geopolitical 
location was also very fragile. Military also rested on this revisionist approach 
83 G. Jenkins, Cantext and Circumstance: The Turkish Military and Politics, Ade1phi Papers 337, 
London: IISS, 2001; N. Narlı, 'Civil-Military Re1ations in Turkey', Turkish Studies, 2000, 1/1, pp. 
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84 N. N arlı, 'Civil-Military Re1ations in Turkey', Turkish Studies, 2000, 1/1, p. 108. 
85 A. Karaosmanog1u, 'The Evo1ution ofNationa1 Security Culture and the Military in Turkey', 
Journal of International Affairs, 2000, 5411, p. 213-
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because the offıcials continued to stress the internal threats and dangers. The society 
also recognized that only an intirnidating, non-politicized body of generals was 
incapable of saving the people and the regime. The histoncal and traditional 
importance of the military also helped this enormously important role of the 
military. The armed officials, so did the people, more rested on military rather than 
the civil rulers and societies. 
4.1.3. The Realpolitik Culture 
In order to evaluate Turkish security culture, one should point out to its 
realpolitik culture. The Ottoman Empire, after the occupation of Istanbul in 1453, 
started to be the hegemonic power in its environment. It was the decider in all 
European states' foreign affairs. Economically, politically and militarily Europe and 
Ottoman Empire were in great interaction and cooperation, with Ottoman Empire 
being the superior. Europe was, as always, divided between the British, Dutch, 
French, Spanish and Austria-Hungarian Empire and it was the Ottoman Empire's 
alliance that was decisive for balance or imbalance. 
From 1299 till 1699 the realpolitik culture was offensive in nature. The goal 
was to expand territory, most of the time towards Europe. Being more powerful 
meant possessing larger territories. S ince 1699, when the European powers put an 
end to their internal divisions and outpaced the Ottoman Empire in terms of 
economic achievements and military technology, the realpolitik security culture of 
the Empire transformed into a defensive one. The goal became to preserve as much 
territory as possible against the military incursions of the European powers. This 
tradition continued till the end of the Ottoman Empire. The Turkish Republic 
inherited this defensive realpolitik security culture from the Ottoman Empire. 
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4.1.4. Westernization 
Traditionally speaking, Westernization has been a security strategy. The goal 
has been to become Westem and to get recognized as such by the Westemers in 
order to feel secure. The aim has been not to experience the dissolution of the 
Ottoman Empire at the hands of the Westemers. During the last century of the 
Ottoman Empire, in order to catch up with the technological and militaristic 
developments in Europe, Ottomans attempted to employ a westernized policy in the 
areas of technology, education and military. The Ottoman officials believed that the 
only way to survive, thus for security, was through applying a powerful use of 
technology and rnilitary equipment and experience. Starting from the 1 7th century, 
administrative structure of Ottomans was modified, exemplifYing the French. 
Ottoman officials recognized that with Westphalia, a nation-state notion was 
created; which notion was obviously against the structure of Ottoman Empire who 
was roling over various different ethnic and religious groups. Ottoman Empire 
understood that the independence-desiring ethnic groups had to be muted and 
satisfied. Thus, in order to eliminate these domestic conflicts and intervention from 
the outside, Sultan gave more and more privileges to the non-Muslim population. 
Westernized legal, administrative and tax-collection system, however, did not 
become sufficient for the non-Muslim population, whose only concem was 
independence and sovereignty as Westphalia Peace promised for. 
4.2. Turkey' s Security Culture and the Europeanization Process 
4.2.1. The Inter-War Period 
The national security policies pursued during both phases had the common 
objective of survival but with the following difference: during the first phase before 
Lausanne, to maintain and secure the Ottoman Empire within defendable borders, 
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that is, to survive by prolonging the life of the empire was the main objective; 
during the second phase, insistence on the international recognition of the 
independence and sovereign equality of the new Turkish state and survival through 
collective security arrangements was the main policy pursued. In both cases, 
Turkish governınents played the great powers against one another and exploited the 
balance of power and the divisions among their opponents, but di d not hesitate al so 
to seek assistance from them, be it economic or military, to remedy the defıciencies 
of the country. 
After Lausanne, the Turkish decision makers, just !ike their Ottoman 
predecessors, also exploited the balance of power and the divisions among their 
opponents. The main difference from the Ottoman days was that the new Turkish 
state was far more internally homogeneous and that its rulers set themselves to 
limited and achievable goals. This was the time for "nation building" at home and 
"peace building" abroad. 
In such a case, to preserve peace, Turkey had to look now for alternative 
forms of security. Turkey faced a range of options similar to the Ottoman policy-
makers in the 19th century. They could either stay out of alliances, relying on the 
balance of power to maintain security, or it could active Iy seek an alliance with one 
of the main European powers, or a coalition of them, but on the winning si de this 
time. 
4.2.2. The Second World W ar Period 
Evaination of the Turkish national security policy during the Second World 
W ar between 1939 and 1945 requires, in the fırst place, an analysis of the policy 
maker profıles of the time. The Icaders who were governing the state at the time, 
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had already experienced the most important stages of the close history !ike the First 
World War, Turkish War oflndependence and foundation of the Turkish Republic 
and they were stili remembering diffıculties of war and their own services. For this 
reason, their first priority was to keep Turkey out of this war.86 
During the WWII Turkish officials were very cautious intheir security 
policies; they had to establish a balance between the sides. Given her important 
geopoliticallocation, both sides increased pressure on Turkey in order to transmit 
their soldiers and military equipment. In this period Turkey was approaching to 
definite neutrality. 
When fate of the war began to turn towards the Allies through the end of the 
year 1942, Turkey adopted atendeney more inclined towards the Allies while 
preserving its neutrality.87 The main objective of the policy that was based on 
Turkey-England Treaty and Turkey-German Non-aggression Treaty was stili 
keeping Turkey out of the war as long as Turkey is not subjected to a direct attract. 
Turkey utilized especially this last article of the Treaty very well during the war and 
managed to avoid from taking part in the war together with England and France by 
stating its military insuffıciency and demanding the amounts stated in the last article 
of the Treaty provision ofwhich were very difficult for the Allies. 88 
' 
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1943 was the most critica! year of the Second World W ar for Turkey. The 
Allies had begun to dominate the war and they had increased their pressure on 
Turkey in order to force it to carry out its obligations. On the other hand, even 
though the Axis Powers were in a defense position they were stili close enough to 
damage Turkey. 89 Amid such increasing pressure, Turkey conducted a successful 
foreign policy, which balanced English and Soviet ambitions on her straits and 
eastem provinces: Kars and Ardahan. 
Turkish National Security Policy in the Second World War cannot be 
outlined simply by saying that Turkey preferred to stay neutral. When the issue is 
more deeply examined, it is seen that staying neutral was never easy when it is 
examined from the point of alliance choices of smail powers, the key theme of the 
policy in that era was implementing a multilateral policy through a ready, powerful 
army in order to be secure. 
Contrary to the idea, which emphasizes that "Turkey was neutral during the 
Second World War, it did not take part in the war between the Allies and Axis 
Forces and stayed completely out of the war.", Turkey showed that it could 
contribute to such an immense war all over the world by staying neutral due to its 
special status despite the fact that great powers applied to all kinds of resorts 
including pressure and threat in order to obtain support of Turkey. 
89 Hale, William M. Turkish Foreign Policy, 1774-2000; Frank Cass London; Portland 2000 
Aydın, Mustafa Türk Dış Politikası Kaynakçası (1923-2000); Stratejik Araştırınalar Merkezi 
Ankara. 
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4.2.3. The Cold W ar Era 
The era of the Cold W ar helped Turkey and Europe build good relations 
since both parties needed each other during such a tense time. The world was 
divided into two, all the states, except the two superpowers the USA and the SU, 
had to choose between the West and the East. Turkey, valuing Ataturk's principle of 
modernization and westernization, chose to become an ally of the West against the 
Communist threat. Europe was also desirous to be allied with Turkey because 
Turkey had historical, ethnic and cultural ties with the Eastem European states that 
were under the influence of Communism. Without Turkey, Europe could not have 
avoided the Soviet Union from spreading their 'evi!' ideas to the further 
Mediterranean and the Arab World. Also, Turkey's militaristic force was undeniably 
powerful as she proved during the Korean War. Thus, during the Cold War, both 
parties were in favor of constructing good relations and being allies.90 
When we come to the threat perceptions of Turkey during the Cold W ar, it 
could be claimed that the threat perceptions of the EU, Westem European Union, 
and Turkey were similar. Both parties' number one enemy was the Soviet Union and 
the ideology of communism. As a newly established democratic republic, Turkey 
was very cautious towards Soviet Union, with whom there had been a good dea! of 
emnity and distrust. On the other hand, Turkey was very desirous of a modernized, 
westemized image and identity, for which she needed to be allied with the West. 
These were the reasons behind the Cold W ar alliance between Europe and Turkey. 
Turkey became a member of NATO, Council of Europe and an associate member of 
90 John Roper, 'The West and Turkey: Varying Roles, Common Interests', The International 
Spectator, Vol. 34, No. I, March 1999, http:www.ciaonet.org/olj/iailiai_99rojl.htınl. 
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the WEU.91 Turkey was very ambitious in her Europeanization efforts during the 
Cold W ar. 
4.2.4. The Post-Co/d W ar Era 
In 1991, the Cold W ar ended with the fal! of Berlin W all and the dissolution 
of the Soviet Union. The end of the Cold W ar has also marked two departure points 
for Turkey from the EU, the fırst of which was the European Union's decision to 
expand its borders giving priority to the former Soviet countries rather than 
attaching her Cold War ally, Turkey. The second reason behind the resentment of 
Turkey lies in Europe's changing threat perceptions, and thus tendeney to exeJude 
Turkey from the membership. 
During the Cold W ar, as pointed above, Turkey' s geo-political and strategic 
locations came very attractive to the Europeans since she was located on a key area, 
having borders to the Soviet Union, Arab World, Caucasus and Balkan region. Thus, 
she seemed to be the ideal ally who could stop Soviet Union to expand her 
influence. 
Turkish military staged a remarkable performance under NATO Command 
in Korea, Kosovo and Bosnia. Turkish contribution to the European Security was 
undeniable during the Cold War. However, Europeans only rewarded Turkish 
alliance and contributions with only making her an Associate Member into the WEU 
with the Treaty of European Union in 1991, alongside Poland, Norway, Iceland, 
Czech Republic, Hungary.92 These Associate Members had the right to participate 
91 Sadi Erguvenc, 'Turkey' s Security Perceptions', Perceptions, Vol. 3, No. 2, August 1998. 
92 Munevver Cebeci, 'A Delicate Process ofParticipation: The Question ofParticipation ofWEU 
Associate Members in Decision-Making for EU-Led Petersberg Operations, with Special Reference 
to Turkey', Occasional Papers, Institute for Security Studies-Western European Union, Nov. 1999, 
p. 3. 
76 
all the meetings of the WEU Council but had no veto rights although had the right to 
propose a policy. Another right of the Associate Members was that they could be 
included in a military intervention with their arrnies. They were also allowed to be 
informed and utilize the intelligence services of the WEU on the same basis with the 
full members. They were expected to support the fınancial spending of the WEU. 93 
The WEU gave its associate members the right to decide independently on 
the issues that are related with their own security situation. Meaning, Turkey had the 
initiative to decide on Cyprus, Aegean Sea Isles and Kurdish Issues with no 
intervention from the WEU. 
Until 1997, Associate Membership in the WEU was not much of a problem 
for Turkey's security. However 1997's Amsterdam Treaty almost collapsed the 
Turkey-ED relations with its insecure provisions for Turkey. CFSP was improved 
more with the Treaty that the WEU was going to be integrated into the EU as the 
security and defense leg of the Union. Most importantly, the Treaty changed the 
Associate Members' status for worse. The question whether they will be included in 
military operations where NATO assets are not utilized was very crucial for 
Associate Members, especially for Turkey. Even if the other members' geo-strategic 
locations and threat perceptions were not as of vital im portance as those of Turkey, 
Turkey had to be very cautious about this question's answer. If EU would use 
NATO assets whenever it wanted, then Turkey would be !efi insecure as she was a 
non-EU country and had many threat perceptions such as Cyprus, Aegean Sea Isles 
and the Kurdish problem. The Amsterdam Treaty had muted the Associate Members 
93 Jbid, pp. 4-5. 
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in ternıs of the decision making process of where and how to intervene.94 Using 
NA TO assets in case a erisis breaks out was important for Europe because European 
states did not have a prepared, powerful military force while NATO does. 
Turkey, however, was reluctant to such a development. She was already an 
important member of NATO since 1950s. Membership into NATO was very 
important for Turkish Republic since it was a Westem organization anda proof of 
Turkey's arnbitian of modemization/westemization. Turkey's primary security 
concem was to preserve its unity, territorial integrity and sovereignty. Thus NATO, 
not the WEU or EU could provide such an international secure environment and 
erase the instabilities and erises the states experience with its enornıous militaristic 
b·ı· 95 capa ııty. 
EU needed to take the approval of all NATO members, including Turkey in 
order to use NATO assets when necessary. Turkey, after 1999's Helsinki Sunımit, 
not to !et the relations with the EU get tense, declared her concems as the following 
quotation reveals: 
" ... NATO ... has proved its effectiveness in creating a secure and stable 
Europe in the last 50 years. What Turkey would urge is that the idea of the 
ESDI should not be contemplated solely on the logic of integration and 
institution-building, but as a gennine and realistic response to the strategic 
facts and requirements of an uncertain security environment. Turkey has 
confırnıed her readiness to support the ESDI in operational, as well as 
political ternıs."96 
Turkey had declared her intentions to be a part of ESDI but she di d not want 
the WEU to be superior to NATO in military ternıs. Turkey did not have a say in the 
94 Ibid, p. 16. 
95 Huseyin Bagci, Jackson James and Ludger Kuhnhardt, eds., Parameters of Partnership: The US-
Turkey-Europe, Baden-Baden: Verlagsgesellschaft, 1999, p. 234; Heinz Kramer, A Changing Turkey: 
Cha/lenge to Europe and the United States, Washington DC: Brookings lnstitution Press, Inter-
American Development Bank, 2000, p. 212. 
96 http://www.mfa.gov.tr/grupa/af/secure.htrn. 
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WEU and her security would be in danger if the WEU or the EU had the right to use 
NATO assets and then decided to solve the issues of Cyprus, Aegean Sea Islands 
according to the wishes of Greece, who was already an EU member. Turkey, after 
the Helsinki Summit of 1999 accelerated her attempts to achieve the criteria set by 
the EU Council to be a full member. However, stili, Europe does not seem to be 
desirous to include Turkey into the Union as a full member. 
Turkey is insistent that any operation in Europe would be related to Turkey's 
security. If Turkey remains outside the European Comrnunity when Greece was a 
part of it, then she would start to see the EU as a threat to her sovereignty and 
security. She desires to have a guarantee status in the EU in order to eliminate her 
threat perceptions about Cyprus and the Isiand in the Aegean Sea.97 Turkish teaders 
state that Turkey is ready to combine her forces to the Rapid Reaction Force of the 
EU with at least 20.000 troops available.98 After all, she had already shown her 
friendship with the EU for the rest of the Cold W ar. Thus as the following quotation 
declares, Turkey was ready to reject EU's use of NATO assets ifEU continued to 
exclude Turkey from the European security perspective: 
" ... the EU would require Turkey's consent to use NATO assets and 
capabilities ... that each request would be decided on a case-by-case basis 
and through consensus."99 
In 2000, The Secretary General of NATO, Lord Robertson well sununarized 
the Turkish fragile security perceptions and her important geo-strategic situation: 
" ... we all need Turkey. Its proximity to the Balkans, the Caucasus, the 
Middle East and the Mediterranean puts Turkey at the center of a vital 
strategic area ... virtually all military scenarios involve Turkey ... ifthe erisis 
is very serious, NATO will be involved- and that includes Turkey. If the 
97 Michel Evans, 'Turks Block Development ofEU Army', Times, 15 December 2000, 
ht!;p://www.thetimes.co.uk./article/0.,20-51726.00.html; Michael R. Gordon, 'Turkey Offers Troops 
forNew European Force, with a Provision', New York Times, 22 November 2000. 
98 Joseph Fitchett, 'Turkey Puts Roadblack in EU Force Negotiations', International Herald Tribune, 
26 January 2001. 
99 http://www.mfa.gov.tr/grupa/af/secure.htm. 
79 
erisis is less prone to escalation, but still requires a signifıcant aınount of 
force, then the EU may lead, but only with the lower end of the spectrum, 
the EU may act autonomously but will want to take into account eventnal 
contributions by Turkey. In any case, Turkey needs to be involved -
because NATO assets are required, because Turkish contributions are 
needed, or because the operation takes place in a region close to Turkey. In 
other words, the military realities of erisis management will ensure that 
Turkey will play a role commensurate with its weight as a major security 
actor."100 
Therefore, Turkey was simply insistent on her veto since she saw such a use 
of NATO assets asa tbreat to her own security. She demanded to participate in the 
decision making process regarding the military interventions. In 2000, Turkey 
armounced that she was ready with her nıilitary capabilities to join the ESDP with 
5000 troops, war planes and ships.101 Europe, on the other side, was insistent on not 
including Turkey in the decision making process. 102 Thus, although the EU 
members reached an agreement to utilize NATO assets and capabilities, Turkey 
immediately vetoed the decision asa NATO member and European states' decisions 
went astray. 
In 2001 's Brussels meeting the EU members warned Turkey to cooperate 
with the EU in the issue of the use of NA TO assets if she wanted to integrate into 
Europe. Leaders of Britain, France and the Netherlands stressed that despite the 
breach of the agreement due to Turkish veto, Europe could stil! achieve to develop 
her CFSP. Greece went further and claimed that it was time that Europe started look 
for an alternative way to develop CFSP outside NAT0. 103 The USA was also 
100 Lord Robertson, 'Turkey anda European Security and Defense Identity', Insight Turkey, Vol. 3, 
No. 1, March 2001, pp. 48-9, http://www.nato.int/doculspeech/2000/s001123a.htın. 
101 Michael R. Gordon, 'Turkey Offers Troops for New European Force, with a Provision', New York 
Times, 22 November 2000. 
102 http://www.euobs.com/index. phtınl?selected _topic~ 13&action=view&article _id~ 1183. 
103 
'ESDP Message fromEuropeto Turkey', http//www.ntvmsnbc.com/news/85347.asp. 
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involved in the issue that she did not want a tense relationship between the EU and 
Turkey as Turkey' s geo-strategic location has always been of her concem. 
Same year, in Budapest, Turkish Prime Minister İsmail Cem gave the fina! 
verdict that although Turkey wanted good relations with Europe and wanted to be a 
part of the military construction of Europe's CFSP, Europe rejected to include 
Turkey from the decision making process. He also pointed out that Turkey, as she 
has a very critica! geo-political and strategic location, had to consider her threat 
perceptions and veto Europe's use of NATO assets without the consent of 
Turkey. 104 
Eventually, in 2001 's Laeken meeting, a compromise was reached between 
Turkey and the EU. Turkey was going to retain her WEU Associate Member rights 
and no military operation regarding Turkey' s security situation will be carried out. 
Thus, Cyprus and Nagharno-Karabagh Crisis were omitted from the security agenda 
of the EU. 105 This issue -Turkey' s place in ESDIIP- was fınally resolved in 2002 
Copenhagen Surnmit. The EU offıcials demanded many reforrns from Turkey and 
also it was decided that Turkey's security agenda will be paid attention when the EU 
plans an intervention. If the intervention includes some area of Turkish security 
interests, then Turkey will be the authority and the EU would not make an 
intervention. Although this problem has been resolved, other problems were going 
to shadow the relations between the EU and Turkey. 
104 http://www.ntvmsnbc.corrı!news/85845. 
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4.2.5. Divergent S ecurity Perceptions of Turkey and the EU 
The end of the Cold W ar even increased Turkey's geo-strategic importance 
and her threat perceptions. Turkey, adopting Ataturk's "Peace at home, peace 
abroad", gave the priority in her security agenda to the protection of territorral 
integrity and national sovereignty. 106 In this regard, NATO was considered as the 
provider of security in Europe and the rest of the World, while the EU was seen as a 
model for modernization and improving the economical conditions of Turkey and 
the fellow European states.107 Turkey has always depicted Turkey as the guarantor 
of peace and stability in the world. 
Turkey' s main threat perceptions are again about the protection of her 
national integrity. The separatist terror organization, PKK, is one of the top issues of 
the security agenda of Turkey. As a country, being a part of four regions 
simultaneously, she has to build good relations and remain secure with Balkan, 
Middle Eastern, European and Caucasus countries. Turkey is in the middle of 
fragile, instable regions and also she has to dea! with Cyprus issue and the Aegean 
Islands problem. 
Also, Russia continues to threaten the Turkish security with the pipelines 
issue and the conflicts in the Caucasus and the Central Asia. The ties between 
Turkey and the Turkic countries of the region force Turkey to take action when 
there is a clash between Russia and them. Also, there are still Russian forces on 
Annenian borders. There are allocation issues in the gas pipelines of Caspian that 
Russia sells her gas to Turkey very expensively and also Russia wants to exeinde 
106 Sadi Erguvenc, 'Turkey' s Security Perceptions', Perceptions, Vol. 3, No. 2, August 1998. 
107 Ali L. Karaosmanoglu, 'NATO Enlargement and the South: A Turkish Perspective', Security 
Dialogue, Vol. 20, No. 2, June 1998. 
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Turkey from the road of gas and oil transportation, which is again an important 
threat to Turkish economic and strategic situation. Another problem with Russia is 
that Turkey suffers from illegal traffıcking and Russia's proliferation of nuclear 
weapons. As the following quotation reveals, Turkey' s security perceptions are a lot 
complicated and bigger in amount than those of the EU states: 
"Turkey .. .in the zone of Maximum Danger will undoubtedly have a 
different threat perception than the Netherlands ... the zone of Maximum 
Peace. Turkey is likely to put more emphasis on NATO's traditional 
collective defense tasks, white the Netherlands will emphasize NATO's 
erisis response operations, including peacekeeping."108 
The main threat perception of the EU is the possible violent ethnic and 
national conflicts as the erises in Kosovo and Bosnia. Secondly, European security 
agenda places the proliferation of nuclear arınamentat the very top. The rogue states 
of the Middle East and also the South African states, hence, are being watched by 
the EU very cautiously. Thirdly, the EU has to dea! with the Eastem Europeans' 
illegal migration, human traffıcking, and drug traffıcking, illegal trade. Fourthly, 
organized erime and international terrorism continue to remain in the EU' s security 
agenda. And fınally there are environınental problems resniting from the 
industrialization, military operations and transportation.109 
It should be pointed here that the proliferation of nuclear weapons is not a 
prior security concem of the EU actually. White Turkey has borders with Iran, on 
whom the US plans an intervention, the European states are geographically away 
form the Middle East and also they prefer to resolve the problems with the Eastem 
Europe at fırst place. However, Turkey has many critica! security issues that 
constitute a threat to her integrity and security such as Kurdish problem, the Middle 
108 Rob de Wijk, Bram Boxhoorn, and Niklaas Hoekstra, NATO After Kosova, Breda: Tilburg 
University Press, 2000, p. 4. 
109 Heinz Kramer, A Changing Turkey: Chal/enge to Europe and the United States, Washington DC: 
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Eastem states' WMD, fue wars fuat are fought on her borders such as the two Iraqi 
wars, fue Cyprus issue, fue Aegean islands issue, terrorism, low economic 
conditions, economic crises, and so forth. 
Firstly, the Naghamo-Karabagh erisis was viewed differently by fue EU and 
Turkey. While Turkey had histoncal and cultural relations with Azerbaijani 
population, Europe did not. And secondly, during and after the Persian Crisis of 
1991, Europe did not respect the Turkish cautious attitude towards the Kurdish 
population. A1so, the War devastated Turkish economy, which the Europeans did 
not even compensate. 
The Cyprus issue is one of fue most signifıcant issues in Turkey's security 
agenda. After 1960, Turkish and Greek citizens started to live togefuer on the isiand 
with Britain, Turkey and Greece being the guarantor states. However, after fue 
violent revolts, in 1974, the isiand was divided into two. The problem arises from 
fue fact that while fue Greek Govemment in the Soufu is recognized to be legitimate 
intemationally, Turkish Govemment offue Northern Cyprus is not. The UN is also 
included in the issue, but there is no concrete result, yet. The probable membership 
of Greek Cypriots would further complicate fue relations between Turkey, Greece 
and also with the EU. 
Turkey's geo-strategic location is exceptional and makes her vulnerable to 
various threats. Other European Union countries do not have such geo-strategic 
location and thus, the threat perceptions ofthe EU are not as concrete and dangerous 
as those ofTurkey's. Turkeyisa bridge between the West and the East, fue energy 
transfer passes from Turkey and all other legal/illegal traffıcking pass from the 
territories of Turkey. S he has historical, cu! tura!, religious, efunic and economic ties 
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with Balkan, Caucasus andArab countries. If either NATO or the EU wants to make 
and keep peace, they definitely need Turkey which can always contribute to the 
peace forces in militaristic, diplomatic and also negotiation terms.110 
4.3. Impacts of the EU Accessinn Process on Turkey' s Security U nderstanding 
As is the case in the field of social science, before beginning to narrate the 
changes in Turkey' s security culture on the road to EU membership, it is plausible 
to have a look at the traditional security culture of Turkey in the Republican era. 
Traditionally, Turkey's security culture during the republican era has been 
based on what the civilian-military bureaucratic elite perceives from the concept of 
national security. Due to the highly effective role and the respectability of the 
Turkish armed forces in the eyes of the Turkish people, security understanding of 
Turkey i.e. that of the civilian-military bureaucratic elite has almost never received 
. . . lll cntıcısm. 
Until the end 1990s Turkey' s traditonal security culture was mainly based on 
two components. Firstly, the fear of abandonment and the fear of loss of territory. 
Secondly, the assumption of geographical determinism. While explaining the fırst 
component; the fear of abandonment and fear of loss of territory, this factor is 
generally associated with the Sevres-phobia which stems from the Sevres Treaty of 
1920. However, as it has been examplified in the previous sections the origins of 
these components can be dated back to the last times of the Ottoman Empire during 
110 Onur Oymen, 'Turkey and !ts Role in European Security Defense', lnsight Turkey, March 2001, 
Vol. 3, No. 1, p. 56. 
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which the Ottoman Empire had to adopt certain which were thought to be dangerous 
for the security of the empire. Namely, those norms had resulted from the rise of 
nationalism among the Christian population and the problems cansed by some 
movements and territorial demands within the empire all left a negative point of 
view in the minds of Turkish people. 112 
The fear of abandonment and fear of loss of territory resulted in minimal 
participation in international affairs during the early republican era and within this 
period which lasted til! the end of the Second World W ar only a few treaties were 
signed including the Balkan Pact of 1934 and the Sadabad Pact of 193 7. Despite the 
fact that Westernization was one of the main characteristics of Turkey' s security 
culture her interaction with the Western world was limited. Only after havingjoined 
NATO Turkey began to make attempts to overcome such fears and began to be 
more active for her security gains related to her international relations; maiuly with 
the West. 
Different from the Cold War period during which both the EU and Turkey 
was alerted against a common threat, in the post-Cold W ar period in addition to the 
already existing threats excluding the one having sternmed from the Soviet Union, 
Turkey also had to begin to stmggle with the PKK. Moreover the efforts for 
probable membership to EU made the fear of abandonment and fear of loss of 
territory reappear inthesecurity agenda ofTurkey.113 
Besides the feeling of 'fear of abandonment and the fear of loss of territory ' 




discourse that has dominated the Repub!ican era. V ari o us discourses on security 
challenge each other within states nonetheless, even if others seek to influence the 
policy-making, it is the state elites who determine the shape of practices. S ince 1923 
Turkey's security policies are shaped by the traditional discourse on security, which 
is a legacy of the Ottoman, during the years Turkey was transferring in to a 
functioning democracy. As Turkey' s accession process with the EU accelerated new 
circumstances began to occur which would create pressures for the security 
discourse to renew itself. As soon as the security culture seemed to be changing on 
the road to EU membership debates over the changing security culture as a result of 
the accession process culture arose between the Euro-skeptics and pro-Europeans. 
The Euro-skeptics believe that the reforms demanded by the EU, threatens 
the national security of Turkey, even if they are aware of the potential advantages of 
the accession to EU. In this connection, they attribute all the demands of the EU 
actors as interference in Turkey' s domestic affairs at the extreme level; attempts 
against the territorial integrity of Turkey. The Euro-skeptics are tend to be anxious 
about one scenario that, if Turkey satisfies all the demands ofEU, and EU will stili 
deny the accession of Turkey, not the scenario that Turkey fails to satisfy the 
requirements of the EU. According to them, if Turkey continues to adopt the 
reforms of EU, within 15 years time, Turkey will be unable to cope with internal 
and extemal threats to i ts national security. 
In contrast to Euro-skeptics, pro-EU actors believe that changes that would 
stern from the accession process with the EU would be a supplier for the 
democratization process. To them, when accession criteria are completely fulfilled, 
the tradition of defıning Turkey' s security policy behind the closed doors will come 
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an end. Then public and representatives of it will have the opportunity to have more 
to say on the security issue. In this case, a better and more effective security policy 
which is in accordance with the contemporary situation will be defıned, which will 
be totally to the benefıt of Turkey. 
While such debates continue concrete examples that prove the claim that 
Turkey' s security culture is on the verge of changing especially after Recep Tayyip 
Erdoğan's Justice and Development Party came to power the appointment of Hilmi 
Özkök as the chief of staff. 
At the very beginning such developments bore questions in minds such as 
what if the two leaders will be unable to cooperate with each other. AKP defıned i ts 
policy in terms of committing to economic liberalization and privatization, !ike the 
way EU want Turkey to uphold, which will contribute to the warming of relations 
with the business elite and the Muslim bourgeoisie. According to Özkök, given that 
AKP remain !oya! to the demands of the consensus their Islamism would not be a 
great concem. 
As the reforms continued, the military representatives on the boards of the 
council of Higher Education and the Radio and Television High Council were 
removed. The Kurds were allowed to broadcast in their own national tongue, in 
2003, the ration of civilians to military offıcers on the NSC was increased, and a 
civilian was elected to head the NSC's secretariat. Changes on a variety of other 
issues had continued within the military leaders continued as such, civilians are 
authorized to supervise the military expenses, the laws those are strengthening the 
military's autonomy were removed. 
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The examples given above can be easily claimed to mean that Turkey is 
changing its security culture. Because, during the time before the EU accession 
process began one could not even imagine that one day Kurds would be allowed to 
broadcast in their own national tongue andfor would attend !ega! Kurdish language 
courses. Furthermore, before the process accelerated it would be absurd to claim that 
the general secretary of the National Security Council would be a civilian. So, ev en 
in the Iight of these brief examples, Turkey is transforming her security culture in 
compliance with the EU criteria. However, it is also a fact that questions raise 
concerning how Iong and to what extent these changes will/will be able to continue. 
4.4. Turkey's Non-European Security Alternatives 
The relations with the US are important for Turkey' s process of European 
integration. Turkey' s geo-strategic Iocation has always attracted the US offıcials and 
the relations between the two parti es have always been good. In the era of the Cold 
W ar, the WEU, the US and Turkey had all the same threat perception, which was 
the spread of communism. After 1991, however, the threat perceptions of the three 
parties began to differentiate. While European states concemed themselves with 
only Europe, the US and Turkey knew that a coherent secure enviromnent needed a 
multi-regiona1 basisY4 Thus, for Arnerica, Turkey was crucial with her 
neighborhood with the Arab World, Caucasus and Balkan countries, not to mention 
her links with those states. 115 When Bill Clinton was in power, Turkey was named 
'frontline state' for AmericaY 6 
"
4 John Roper, 'The West and Turkey: Varying Roles, Common Interests', The International 
Spectator, Vol. 34, No. !, March 1999. 
ııs Za1may Halilzad, The Future ofTurkish- Western Relations: Towards A Strategic Plan, Sarrta 
Monica: RAND, 2000, pp. 54-61. 
"
6 F. Stephen Larabee, 'US and European Policy toward Turkey and the Caspian Basin', RAND 
Reprints, Santa Monica, 1998, p. 145. 
89 
The European states, on the other hand, after the Cold W ar, are unwilling to 
ineJude Turkey in the EU. The rejection of the European Constitution in France and 
the Netherlands were also an indication to the European population's unwillingness 
to see Turkey integrated into Europe. With her 70 million-population, Islamic 
identity and fragile security location, Europeans consider Turkey as a new threat to 
European security. Ian O Lesser explains the European Union's concerns as it 
follows: 
" ... as Europe looks to the creation of its own defense identity, there is a 
risk that Turkey will be seen asa strategic and political liability: a strategic 
liability because of its complex and immediate security concerns; a 
politica1 liability because of its position outside the Euroyean Community 
and its close bilateral relationship with the United States," 17 
As the quotation declares, Turkey' s possible integration into the EU is seen 
as a burden for the Europeans. The US, on the other hand, is always attracted to be 
an ally of Turkey. Therefore, the US officials worked hard to convince the European 
states to include Turkey into the CFSP as one ofD's, Discrimination indicated. 
As Europeans postpone the Turkish membership into the EU, Turkish 
politica1 leaders tend to build close relationship with the US rather than waiting for 
the European ambiguity to end. After all, the US is enormously rich in material, 
militaristic and information capabilities. If Turkey wants to guarantee its security in 
case of a nuclear attack or a separatist threat, it is natural for her to trust in the US 
defense capability. America also needs Turkey because of her geo-strategic location 
and her ties with the Arab World. 
Turkish-Israeli Relations are also good and friendly as the State of Israel is 
one of the constant allies of the US. When Turkey, the US and the State oflsrael are 
II? Graham Fuller and Ian O. Lesser, Turkey"s New Geopolitics: From the Balkans to Western China. 
San Francisco: Westview Press, 1993, pp. 101-3. 
90 
considered together, they have all the nuclear threat coming from the rogue states at 
the top of their security agendas.ıı 8 
Another important point about the good relations between Turkey and the 
US is that the US does not force Turkey to adopt a whole bunch of adoptions and 
want her to compensate from her security defense as the EU does.119 The US knows 
very well that Turkey is very cautious about the Kurdish problem and the histoncal 
tense relations with the Greek state. Also, the US does not demand from Turkey to 
convert her administration system, resembling the American one. The point is that in 
order to have good relations and be friendly, the allies should not constantly asks for 
more reforms and changes everyday just as the EU asks for from Turkey . 
• 4.5. A Theoretical Analysis of Turkey 's and the E U' s S ecurity Cultures 
The European Union of today is a result of developments that took almost 50 
years. The Union was at the beginning an economic-oriented Coal and Steel 
Company and there was no intention at first related with the idea of common 
security identity. For the rest of the Cold W ar, the US provided Europe with security 
defense. The continent and the UK achieved to be an integrated economic giant as 
time went by but they could not construct a successful, collective security identity 
yet. The EU could not become a supranational organization with all the members 
having a single cultural and security identity. The rejection of the Constitution in 
2003 and the Atlanticİst attitude of Britain are indications to the difficulty for the 
EU to become fully integrated. 
118 Tarik Oguzlu, 'An Analysis of Turkey' s Prospective Membership in the European Union from a 
'Security' Perspective', Security Dialogue, Sage Publications, 2003, Vol. 43/3, p. 285. 
119 lbid, p. 295. 
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Neo-realists would put forward that the EU remaıns to be an 
intergovemmental organization with no actual unification because the members are 
not trusting in the organization' s capability to serve for the security and defense of 
the members. For example France seerus to be very skeptical toward the EU's 
supranational character as the rejection of the Constitution demonstrated. Nation-
state notion, in most of European states seerus to be stili having the priority. The 
citizens count on the national govemment to provide security and peace rather than 
a Union, which seerus to be very complex with its organs and slow decision-making 
and implementing processes. After all, as realists believe, international community 
is chaotic, thus the individual states should not go furtber from making some 
arrangements with the fellow states. Being alısorbed by a supranational, chaotic 
international community would bring the death of sovereignty. 
Realists would support the idea that Turkey should stop waiting to be a 
member of the EU since the threat perceptions of the two are different, the EU's 
lack of collective security identity and the intra-problems in it. After all, even the 
members of the EU have reluctance to the idea of full integration. 
The liberal school thinkers believe in the importance of political, economic 
and social developments that they are not obsessed with the iınportance of security; 
they would explain the EU' s present situation as a successful organization since it is 
the second biggest trader and the largest market of the world. The EU, though it 
lacks a coherent collective security identity, has improved considerably in 
economic, social and diplamatic terms. Liberals would support the development of 
CFSP under the framework of the EU since they believe that an international 
community that consists of the like-minded regimes, democracies preferably, would 
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help become more secure. Also, liberals emphasize the non-ınilitaristic tools of 
peace making and peace keeping, at which Europe is very good at since the EU 
lacks a multinational collective army. 
Liberal School ofthought would urge Turkey to fulfıll the EU demands to be 
a member and thus integrate into Europe since Europe would help Turkish 
government with economic, social and cultural easiness and benefıts. 
Critica! approach, as an approach of the underdeveloped countries, would 
emphasize the domestic problems of Turkey and that she, first of all, should 
complete her democratization process. If democracy becomes the only game in 
town, then Turkey would automatically be more secure after eliminating the 
domestic anti-regime eneınies. The EU process would help Turkey to accelerate her 
democratization process so Turkey should continue her policies of the EU 
membership. However, Turkey, in her adoption process to the EU, has to 
compensate from the security issues of Cyprus, Kurdish problem and the Aegean 
Islands. Thus, revisionists would state, Turkey should never compensate while 
attempting to attach herselfto the EU. The Kurdish problem would destroy Turkish 
sovereignty and national integration. Revisionist School would see the US and Israel 
and other regional al!iances more attractive and benefidal for Turkey' s security. 
The constructivists, on the other side, would draw the attention to the cultural 
and identities of the subjects. The EU members are all Christian and they are all 
economically well-developed countries with high levels of literacy. Their cultural 
and histoncal ties are strong. They use the same currency with a few exceptions. 
However, there are stil! sharp cultural differences between the members. Britain did 
not accept to change i ts currency and she is the closest ally of the US. France, on the 
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other hand, is opposed to many of the US policies. The rejection of the Common 
European Constitution also proved that the members are not desirous to be 
integrated. There is no single strategic culture of Europeans, thus they cannot 
become a single body that can decide on a policy and implement it easily. Turkey is 
fully different with i ts culture, security identity, religion, language and economical 
situation from the European states. Thus, constructivists would urge the European 
states to construct a collective pan-European security identity in order to provide the 
European security with no regard to NATO or other superior organs. And Turkey, 
constructivists would say, should look for altemative arrangements and allies in 
order to guarantee her security since she has a very different, unique security 
culture, identity and geo-strategic location. 
The English School, as mentionedin the second chapter, would state that the 
present image and construction of the EU resembles the pluralist approach with no 
collective security identity. The individual states give priority to the domestic 
problems and their own identity. However, European states are seemingiy 
improving their CFSP and after a long time we may see the EU tum out to be a 
solidarist organization with a collective identity and supranational outlook. 
4.6. Conclusion 
In conclusion, the security culture and policies of the Ottoman Empire and 
Turkish Republic have common and distinct points. The Ottoman Empire, until ı7'ıı 
century' s Karlowitz Agreement was an important world power who had the ability 
to resolve the conflicts and lead the European states. After the Karlowitz Treaty, 
Europeans started to take the lead technologically and politically, forcing the 
Ottomans to follow a balance-of-powers policy. In 1839 Ottoman Empire started to 
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modernize itself to reverse its backwardness and insecurity. Non-muslim millets 
were given privileges and the military, educational, !ega!, administrative systems 
were regulated. However the reforms co u! d not stop the dissolution of the Empire. 
Young Turks obtained power in 1908 and with a German adoration, put the Ottoman 
state into the WWI which ended destructively for the Ottomans. 
After the declaration of the Republic, Ataturk and his friends were very 
cautious about the state's security policies. The main principle became peace at 
home peace alıroad because Ataturk knew that any aggressive policy would bring an 
end to the tired, poor, newly founded state. A communist Russia, the chaotic Middle 
East and a greedy Europe had to be balanced through peaceful policies. Also, 
internal regime enemies had to be eliminated, too. As the economic conditions were 
poor and the domestic conditions were fragile, Turkish politicians did not join the 
WWII; they made alliances in order to guarantee the national security in the case of 
a surprise attack, though. 
During the Cold War, Turkey had watched a very cautious security policy 
again. Not trusting in the communists, especially during the Stalinİst regime, Turkey 
seemed to be more close to the West, the USA. She sent troops for the Korean W ar 
and joined NATO in 1952, becoming an important, strategic member of the 
Organization. 
The end of the Cold War made a new world order with multilateralism 
getiing on the scene. The world ceased to be a hipolar world and various regional 
and major actors appeared with new threat for the national security of the indi vi dua! 
states. The nuclear armament, environmental problems, ethic and religious conflicts 
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broke out. The Persian Gulf Crises, Iraqi invasion and Lebanon Crisis and other 
conflicts were all signifıcant for Turkey's national security. Thus, Turkey had to be 
cautious in all Caucasus, Middle East and Balkan regions; she had to construct a 
powerful, intimidating military. In her democratization process she had to rely on 
armed offıcials more than the civil politicians. Turkey knew how to stay away from 
conflicts and provide the balance in this almost chaotic international community and 
protected its territorial integrity and sovereignty. Today, she is working hard to be a 
member of the EU, which membership, she hopes, would better help her to feel 
secure amid so many conflicts and threats around her. 
The EU accession process forced Turkey to conduct a more moderate policy 
ın some critica! security issues such as Cyprus and Kurdish issues. The EU 
demanded from Turkey to convert into a federal state system step by step. However, 
the administration system of Turkish Republic is unitary. While the EU asked for 
many concessions and reforms, the membership date is not clear yet. This 
ambiguous accession process led to an insecure and unreliable attitude towards the 
EU by the Turkish political and military elite. Turkey' s security understanding rests 
on unitary state syste~ secularism, integrity and sovereignty. The security 
understanding of the EU restsona secure, peaceful Europe. Turkey has to fıght with 
many hard-core security issues as well as the soft core ones. Europe, however, as a 
developed and welfare continent, only has to fıght with some soft core issues. Thus, 
Turkey and the EU do not seem to meet on the same point in a foreseeable future. 
The point is that many of the EU countries' officials consider the integration 
and expansion policies as dangerous; especially a possible membership of Turkey 
could devastate the Union with additional issues that are hard to dea! with. Europe 
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wants a continent where there is no illegal trafficking, organized cnme and 
environmental dangers. Turkey, however, in the middle of so many critical regions, 
wants to protect its sovereignty, integrity, identity and also become a welfare state. 
European Union members believe that Turkey's integration would mean more issues 
such as WMD issue, rogue states, terrorism, Kurdish minority and separatist 
movements, economic poverty, ete ... 
Turkey's security perceptions are concrete and more dangerous when 
compared to those of the EU. Turkey is located very near to the Arab World where 
is full of rogue states with anti-democratic regimes and nuclear armarnent. There is 
Russian threat in the north and she has also many domestic economic and social 
problems what are absent in the EU. These reasons were behind the veto decision of 
Turkey in the issue of the EU' s accession to NA TO assets and capabilities. 
While Europe is reluctant to the membership of Turkey as it excluded 
Turkey from the decision making process of the ESDI and forces her to adopt a 
good dea! of EU criteria, the US has always been friendly to Turkey and knows how 
important the geo-strategic conditions are. The nuclear threat is the nnmber one 
issue on the US agenda as it was proven with 2003 Iraqi invasion and a possible 
attack on Iran in the near future. Thus, if the EU continues to put limits on the 
integration into Europe, Turkey would start to perceive the EU as a threat and vice 
versa since the threat perceptions of the two are divergent and sometimes contrary 
as in the issues ofGreece and the use ofNATO assets. 
However, despite the above mentioned disputes between the EU and Turkey 
from the point of security concems, it is also a fact that Turkey began to change or 
least to say modify her security culture with the effects of the EU accession process. 
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To support this claim it would be suffıcient to give the examples in the following 
security issues about which Turkey once conducted a very strict policy. For 
instance, the removal of military representatives from the boards of Higher 
Education and the Radio and Television High Council, granting the Kurds the right 
of education in their owu national tongue and the replacement of the general 
secretary of the National Security Council with a civilian. Before the accession 
process began one could not have estimated that one day Kurds would be able to 
broadcast in their owu tongue and attend legal Kurdish language courses. 
Furthermore 1 O years ago it would have been absurd to clairn that a civilian would 
be appointed to the general secretariat of the NSC. 
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CONCLUSION 
After making an introduction in the fırst chapter, the defınition of security, 
theoretical dimension of the understanding of security has been given in the second 
chapter of the thesis. Security is said to be a dynamic concept which is due to 
change according to different environments, cultures, nations, and so forth. 
Although the security perceptions are changeable, the importance of the issue of 
security is undeniable. The political societies become ali ve and survive if the rolers 
of that political society are successful in protecting the sovereignty and integrity of 
the political system and society. There are fıve approaches to security discussing the 
need for security, how it should be provided, by whom and also the threat 
perceptions for a state. 
The most conventional approach is the realist approach whose fırst 
assumption is that the international community is anarchic so the individual state 
should not trust in any fellow state or a superior organization or international law. 
The states should be strong and pay a huge attention to the provision of the security. 
The second approach we covered is the liberal approach which believes the 
international community is regulated according to certain rules and principles and 
does not believe that the individual states should be paranoid to be obsessed with 
security. Rather, economic and social developments should be given importance. 
Both of the approaches take the fırst world states as their subjects. The revisionist 
(critica!) approach on the other si de, gave importance to the security understanding 
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of the third world states. Revisionists believe that the lack of consolidated 
democracy and social problems create internal threats for the state and the state 
should have a strong army to fight with the internal enemies. Therefore, the 
undeveloped states' security understanding should first take the domestic problems 
into account. 
The most important approach was constructivist approach because they 
explained the national security policies of the states according to identity and social 
realities of them. Identity, as a constructed notion, decides the security policies of a 
nation because security is all about the society of a nation who constructs every kind 
of identity, including the security identity, according to their own cultural, 
traditional and histoncal facts. Thus, security perceptions are changeable and 
appointed according to the national identity. The English School of Thought also 
paid attention to the im portance of national identity with regard to national security 
policies. While solidarist branch of the school claimed that a supranational 
organization adopting the same, collective identity would serve as a successful tool 
for security. The pluralists, on the other hand, believed that the domestic politics and 
identity is more important while appointing the national security policy. 
When these theories are applied to the case of Turkish national security, we 
would see that, as a third world country, or a developing one, she has to fight with 
the domestic problems and low economic conditions in the first place. Also, as the 
international community is guided by the rules and principles that mostly serve for 
the good of the industrialized countries, Turkey should keep her army strong and be 
cautious against the threats emanating from the multiregional external enemies. 
In the third chapter, the evolutional developments of the EU have been 
handled. After two magnificent wars that destructed the European continent, the 
European states decided to be cautious towards a possible revival of German 
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aggression. With the beginning of the Cold W ar in 1945, Europeans became an ally 
of the USA against the Soviet threat. In the beginning, Europe was a multinational, 
economically powerful continent who would fall under the influence of 
communism. Thus, Truman implemented the Marshall Plan and the Containment 
Policy to empower the European states and make them a trade partner and a strong 
ally against the Comınunist Bloc. In 1949, NATO was established and started to 
provide security for the world. The presence of NATO was going to render the plan 
of collective European defense abortive for the rest of the Cold W ar. 
Through the end of the Cold W ar, in 1986, European issued Single European 
Act declaring that a collective European security system was a must. In 1991's 
Treaty of the European Union, CFSP was decided to be the second piliar of the EU. 
The ESDI was built in order to react the erisis sitnations in Europe or elsewhere, 
however European Union forces, until today, could never resolve a crisis. Rather, it 
was NATO forces that kept and made peace everywhere. Although the EU became 
an economic giant and integrated in terms of economics, they have not constructed a 
solid unity with a single European identity in terms of foreign policy, security and 
defense. The members of the EU stili seem to approve the pluralist approach of the 
English school rather than the solidarist one. 
The main items of the EU security culture are stopping iliegal human, drug 
trafficking, stopping organized erime and international terrorism, eliminating the 
environmental polintion that results from industrialization, wars and militaristic 
studies, making Europe a peaceful and welfare continent, spreading the European -
Westem- ideals and values to the Eastem Europe and the rest of the world, if 
possible, contributing to the democratization process of the iliiberal democracies of 
the Eastem Europe and finally, later in the security agenda list, stopping the spread 
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and proliferation of the nuclear weapons. As it is seen, the prior security threats are 
of soft core while Turkish security concerns are mainly hard core. 
In the fina! chapter, the Turkish evolution of security cu!ture on the road to 
EU membership and understanding since the Ottoman times has been uncovered. 
Although Ottoman Empire was the decider of international relations from lSth 
century until the Karlowitz Agreement, she had to fal! behind the European powers 
and the Russian Empire from 1699 on. European powers and the Russian Empire 
started to be dominant, thus in order to be secure, the Ottoman Jeaders had to imply 
balance-of-power politics. Also, in order to reverse the backwardness of the Empire 
in militaristic, technological terms, the offıcials started a westernization process, too. 
With Tanzimat and Isiahat reformsin 19th century, the Empire wanted to improve 
the Empire in technological and militaristic terms and also mute the minorities 
through giving them !ega!, economic and social privi!eges. However, as nationalism 
was on rise and also because of the separatist interventions of European and Russian 
powers, the Empire dissolved after the Joss of the WWI. 
The declaration of the Republic and the Lausarme Treaty marked the 
beginning of a peaceful and cautious foreign policy attitnde. The Sevres Treaty, 
however always remained as an indication of the European powers' evi! intentions. 
Thus, although westernization and modernization were the principles of Atatürk, he 
knew that Europeans should be approached cautiously in terms of security. Turkey 
has always been friendly towards Europe that she chose to be an ally of the West 
against the Coınmunist Bloc during the Co!d War. Turkish contributions for the 
Korean War made her a member of NATO. She followed a multinational security 
policy and never made a concession from national integrity and the principle of 
"peace at home, peace abroad". She did not participate in the WWII thanks to İsmet 
İnönü' s cautious approach. 
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After the Cold W ar, in the middle ofvery threatening regions with Greek and 
Kurdish problems, Turkey attempted to attach herself into the EU. The Middle East 
is especially problematic and there is the nuclear threat. Turkey's geo-strategic 
conditions force her to have a strong army and allies in order to feel secure. After 
the Cold W ar, the world became a multilateral world and since Europe seems to be 
unwilling towards Turkish membershlp, Turkey should be allied with the USA and 
make multilateral, bilateral arrangements to eliminate the international threats she is 
face to face. 
The threat perceptions of the EU and Turkey were compared and it was 
concluded that the threat perceptions and security understanding of the two are 
different. While Turkey has many internal and external enemies and threats, Europe 
is more concerned with the social, economic problems of the European states. 
Turkey's threat perceptions are about the Kurdish problem, Cyprus, Aegean Sea 
Islands, Russia, Armenia, and also domestic problems of Islamic fundamentalism 
and low economic conditions. With so many important problems, Turkey stili 
believes she could contribute to the ESDI and be a full member of the EU. She 
believes her geo-strategic condition and links with many of European states and also 
other states of the Middle East and Central Asia would help the EU better dea! with 
the erises in these territories. However, the EU's ambiguous approach toward 
Turkey carries the risk of negatively affecting Turkey's relations with Greece. EU 
ambiguity might also lead Turkey come much closer to the USA and Israel in the 
realm of security. 
All in all, despite all the above mentioned problems, disputes and concerns it 
is al so a clear fact that Turkey' s accession process with the EU has affected and 
continue to affect Turkish policies including the one related to the national security. 
In order to comply with the EU accession criteria Turkey began to change or least to 
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say modify in more a moderate way her national secnrity policy. The fact that the 
military representatives on the boards of the council of Higher Education and the 
Radio and Television High Council were removed, Kurds were allowed to broadcast 
in their own national tongue and a civilian was elected to head the N SC' s secretariat 
is clear indication of the effects of the accession process on Turkey' s secnrity 
culture. The fact that Turkish foreign policy has gradually gained a liberal character 
over the last decade can also be explained in reference to Turkey' s EU membership 
process. Turkey now pursues "a benign regional power" role in its environment. 
Non-military solutions to security problems are increasingly sought. Adoption of 
multi-lateral and co operational strategies in relations with neighbors is now "rule" 
rather than "exception". While there exist such clear indications regarding the 
changes on the secnrity culture of Turkey, there also exist questions whether these 
changes will continue. If so how Jong and to what extent will they continue? The 
only preliminary answer to this question might highly probably be: The time will 
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